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I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This staff report responds to the March 18, 1993 request from
Congressman Edward J. Markey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce,
that the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission
("Commission" or "SEC") study the need for, and any impediments to,
the independence of public accountants
in performing their
responsibilities under the Federal securities laws.
Chairman
Markey requested that the Commission provide the Subcommittee with
any recommendations for legislation that the Commission may
consider appropriate or any conclusions regarding changes in the
Commission's rules that may be required for the protection of
investors or in the public interest.
Chairman Markey's letter is
reproduced at Appendix I.
This report, prepared by the staff of the Office of the Chief
Accountant
of
the
Commission
("OCA"),
provides
background
information on the issue of auditor independence (section II ) ,
discusses
the
Commission's
independence
rule
and
related
interpretations (section III) and pronouncements of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (section IV) and other
nations' independence requirements (section V), and, finally,
discusses
recent
and
certain
current
proposals
regarding
independence issues (section V I ) .
The staff of the OCA does not, at this time, recommend (a)
enactment of additional
legislation or
(b) promulgation of
additional rules by the Commission with respect to the independence
of external auditors to public companies.
The Federal securities
laws require that the financial statements of public companies be
audited by independent accountants.
The Commission has the
authority under those laws to define the term independent. The
Commission has
adopted a rule
to
implement
the
statutory
requirement
and,
from
time
to
time,
has
provided
formal
interpretations of the term.
The Commission staff has, from time
to time, provided both written and oral interpretations of the
term.
The Commission, when necessary, has instituted formal
complaints
against
auditors
that
it has
found not
to be
independent.
Lastly, the Commission has resorted to the Courts,
when necessary, to enforce the Commission's interpretations of the
term.
The staff of the OCA believes that no further legislation
or rules or regulations are necessary for the protection of
investors.
II.

BACKGROUND

Summary
Prior to the enactment of the Federal securities laws, many
in the accounting profession recognized the need for auditors to
be independent from their audit clients if their audit reports were
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to add credibility to the financial reporting process.
This
requirement for auditors to be independent was written into the
Federal securities laws and the Commission, since its inception,
actively has enforced it.
At least 40 enforcement actions, more
than ten interpretive releases, and various releases in which the
Commission proposed or adopted disclosure items, such as the
auditor change disclosures required to be filed on Form 8-K,
discuss auditor independence issues.
Also, as noted elsewhere in
this report, the Commission staff responds to requests for oral
advice on auditor independence issues almost daily, and maintains
a public file of responses to written requests for such advice.
The. Need for Auditor Independence
The independence of accountants who audit the financial
statements included in filings with the Commission is crucial to
the credibility of financial reporting and, in turn, the capital
formation process.
The public confidence in the reliability of
issuers' financial statements that is provided by the performance
of independent audits encourages investment in securities issued
by public companies.
This sense of confidence depends on
reasonable
investors
perceiving
auditors
as
independent
professionals who have neither mutual nor conflicting interests
with their audit clients and who exercise objective and impartial
judgment on all issues brought to their attention.
The Federal securities laws recognize the importance of
independent audits b y requiring, or permitting the Commission to
require, that financial statements filed with the Commission by
public companies, investment companies, broker/dealers, public
utilities,
investment advisers, and others, be certified (or
audited) by independent public accountants,1 / and by granting the

1/

For example, items 25 and 26 of Schedule A to the Securities
Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. 77aa(25) and (26), and
§17(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
A c t ”), 15 U.S.C.
78q, expressly require that financial
statements be audited by independent public or certified
accountants. Sections 12(b)(1)(J) and (K) and 13(a)(2) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 781 and 78m, §§5(b)(H) and (I),
10(a)(1)(G), and 14 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 79e(b), 79j , and 79n, §§8(b)(5) and 30(e)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-8 and
80a-29, and §203 (c) (1)(D) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(c)(1), authorize the Commission to
require the filing of financial statements that have been
audited by
independent
accountants.
Accordingly,
the
Commission has required that certain financial statements be
audited by independent accountants.
See, e.g., Article 3 of
Regulation S-X, 17 CFR §210.3-01 et seq.
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Commission the authority to define the term "independent."2/
Currently, more than 13,000 public companies file audited, annual
financial statements with the Commission under the Exchange Act
alone. In addition, audited financial statements were used in 1992
in the United States in connection with the public issuance of $718
billion of securities, a 46 percent increase from the prior year.3 /
Given the large volume of filings made with the Commission by
public companies and other entities, the Commission staff is not
able to review each financial statement in detail.
During 1992,
however, the Commission's Division of Corporation Finance reviewed
approximately 3,058 reporting issuers' financial statements and
related disclosures.4/
These reviews by the staff, barring an
enforcement inquiry, were limited to documents filed with the
Commission (or provided supplementally to the staff) and are not
a substitute for the testing of the account balances and
transactions
and an evaluation
of
events,
conditions,
and
circumstances underlying financial statements that comprise an
audit.
By necessity,
the Commission relies heavily on the
accounting profession 5 / to be primarily responsible for examining

2/

Section 19(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77s(a), § 3 (b) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(b), § 20(a) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 79t(a), and § 38(a) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-37(a), grant
the Commission the authority to define accounting, technical,
and trade terms used in each Act.

3/

See Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Before the Subcommittee on Securities
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, Concerning the Commission's Authorization Request for
Fiscal Years 1994-1995, at 2 (July 29, 1993).

4/

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Fifty-Eighth Annual
Report, at 54-55 (1992).

5/

Due in part to the franchise granted under the Federal
securities laws to the accounting profession to audit the
financial statements of public companies, the accounting
profession has grown and prospered. The six largest firms are
international service organizations generating $11.6 billion
in annual U.S. revenues, $31.3 billion in annual worldwide
revenues, and having approximately 8,350 partners and 71,700
professional staff in the U.S.
Five of the six firms derive
approximately half of their revenues from accounting and
auditing services. Public Accounting Report at 1, 3-5 (March
31, 1993).
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the huge volume of financial data that forms the cornerstone of the
Commission's full disclosure system.6 /
The Independence Concept
Much of the U.S. theory of auditing and independence appears
to have come from the United Kingdom.7/
U.S. accounting firms
generally began conducting audits in order to report to foreign
entities, principally in the United Kingdom, on the status of their
U.S. investments.
As their auditing practices grew and the demands of U.S.
investors for financial information increased, accountants in this
country began to recognize the same importance in obtaining the
public's confidence (as opposed to the confidence of their clients'
managements) that had been recognized a generation before in the
U.K.8 /
For example,
Charles Reckitt stated in The Public
Accountant (Philadelphia), in January 1900:
A public accountant acknowledges no master but the public ....
A public accountant's certificate,
though addressed to
president or directors, is virtually made to the public, who

6/

See Touche R oss & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
609 F.2d 570, 580-581 (2d Cir. 1979), which states:
The role of the accounting and legal professions in
implementing the objectives of the disclosure policy (in
the Federal securities laws] has increased as the number
and complexity of securities transactions has increased.
By the very nature of its operations, the Commission,
with its small staff and limited resources, cannot
possibly examine, with the degree of close scrutiny
required for full disclosure, each of the many financial
statements which are filed.
Recognizing this, the
Commission must rely heavily on both the accounting and
legal professions to perform their tasks diligently and
responsibly.
Breaches of professional responsibility
jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of the
securities laws and can inflict great damage on public
investors.

7/

For a general discussion of the historical development of the
concept of auditor independence, see generally, Previts, The
Scope o f CPA Services (John Wiley & Sons, 1985).

8/

D. Causey, Duties and Liabilities of Public Accountants, at
30-31 (Dow Jones-Irwin, rev. ed. 1982).

5
are actually or prospectively stockholders. He should have
ability, varied experience and undoubted integrity. 9 /
Arthur Lowes Dickinson, a British accountant, who soon after
his arrival in this country was chosen to head Price Waterhouse's
U.S. operations, foresaw the development of legislation in this
country that would be patterned after the British example.
In an
article published in 1902, he stated:
It may well be that legislation will eventually be necessary
before complete protections are assured to the public.
But
all those who are against government interference with private
enterprises, while desiring to compel reasonable publicity in
the affairs of commercial undertakings, can direct this
legislation to safe channels by using their influence to so
firmly establish the principle of independent audits by public
accountants that the state will merely have to make compulsory
a course of action already adopted by the majority of wellmanaged enterprises.10/
The use of independent audits did increase in the U.S. and by
April 1932 all corporations applying for listing on the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") were asked by the NYSE to agree to have
their future financial statements audited by independent public
accountants.1 1 / When the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act")
was adopted, the financial statements of eighty-five percent of the
companies listed on the NYSE were audited by independent public
accountants.12/

9/

Previts,

supra, at 33.

10/

Id. at 30 quoting Dickinson, "Duties and Responsibilities of
the Public Accountant," in The English View of Accountants'
Duties and Responsibilities: 1881-1902. ed. Michael Chatfield,
New York: A m o , 1978, at 153-160.

11/

L. Rappaport, SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure. 26.326.4 (The Ronald Press Company, 3d ed. 1972). Attempts by the
NYSE to require all listed companies to have their financial
statements audited, however, had failed.
See, Part 4, Stock
Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 239,
Resolutions to Thoroughly Investigate Practices of Stock
Exchanges with Respect to the Buying and Selling and the
Borrowing and Lending of Listed Securities, the Values of Such
Securities and the Effects of Such Practices, Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
72d Cong., 2d Sess., 1356-1358 (January 11 and 12, 1933).

12/

See, Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 60 (1933) ("1933 Senate
Hearings").
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Prior to the enactment of the 1933 Act, however, there were
few if any professional rules in this Country defining the scope
of auditor independence. This may have been because practitioners
considered independence to be a "habitual state of mind,” or a
"cultural ought. " 1 3 / It was believed unwise to assume someone was
independent merely if he or she followed a few specific rules; just
as it was considered unwise to assume that anyone who participated
in a particular activity always would not be independent.14/ Also,
as there was no legal requirement to be independent of audit
clients,
there was no compelling need for clear tests of
independence.
Despite the lack of specific rules prior to 1933, the meaning
and scope of "independence" actively was being debated. As today,
a main controversy concerned the expansion of advisory services
versus the need for public confidence in the audit process.
In
1925, Arthur Andersen (founder of the firm bearing his name) said:
[T]he businessman has found that advice from an accounting
viewpoint m a y have high cash value in the form of taxes saved
or refunded, war contracts liquidated, in recapitalizations
and refinancings effected advantageously....
The present*
day accountant who is alert will grasp every opportunity to
foster this attitude by increasing the constructive value of
all normal work and seeking newer and broader fields of
service to business management.15/
Herbert Freeman, however, cautioned that accountants should
not accept engagements that "lead them into the executive field"
or "charge them with the responsibilities of administration" until
the "status of the profession is established by legislative
action."16/ That legislative action began in 1933.
When members of the accounting profession appeared before
Congress in 1933 to argue that the financial statements of public
companies should be required to be audited by "independent

13 /

Previts,

supra, at 42-43.

14/

Id.
As late as 1932, the accounting profession disapproved
a proposed professional resolution indicating that dual roles
of auditor and director or officer of a corporation tend to
destroy the auditor's independence.
Rappaport, supra, at
26.2-26.3.

15 /

Previts, supra, at 45 quoting reprint of the address, A.
Andersen, "The Accountant's Function as Business Adviser, " The
Journal of Accountancy, at 18-19 (January 1926).

16/

Id. at 46-47.
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accountants," Congress was able to find support for their arguments
in British law and the practice of eighty-five percent of NYSE
companies.1 7 / With these examples, and what Congress undoubtedly
felt was a lack of controversy in requiring such audits, it is not
surprising that the issue is not addressed in House, Senate, or
Conference Reports regarding the initial adoption of the Federal
securities laws.1 8 / At related hearings, however, Congress briefly
did consider establishing a corps of government auditors who would
verify corporate account balances of public companies and review
company books. After hearing testimony from representatives of the
accounting profession that the profession could perform such tasks
more effectively, and at less cost, Congress chose to entrust the
accounting profession with the responsibility for auditing the
financial statements of Commission registrants.19/
The Federal Trade Commission, immediately following adoption
of the 1933 Act and prior to the formation of the SEC, issued a
regulation under the 1933 Act providing that an accountant would
not be considered independent with respect to any person with whom
the accountant had any interest, directly or indirectly, or with
whom the accountant Was connected as an officer, agent, employee,
promoter, underwriter, trustee, partner, director, or a person
performing a similar function.20/
Practically since its inception, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has addressed auditor independence issues. For example,
in the 1936 case of In the Matter of Cornucopia Gold M i n e s .21/ the

17/

1933 Senate Hearings at 56-60. See generally, J. Wiesen, The
Securities Acts and Independent Auditors: What Did Congress
Intend? (a research study prepared for the Commission on
Auditors' Responsibilities, AICPA, 1978).

18/

Id.
See also, B. Committee, Independence of Accountants and
Legislative Intent. 41 Ad. L. Rev. 33, 37 (1989).

19/

1933 Senate Hearings at 55-60. During one hearing, Col. A.H.
Carter, then president of the New York State Society of
Certified Public Accountants, stressed the fact that outside
accounting firms would be independent of management.
During
this discussion, Col. Carter, in differentiating between
controllers employed by companies and independent accountants,
stated,
"the public accountant audits the controller's
accountant."
Senator Barkley then asked, "Who audits you?"
Col. Carter's often quoted reply was, "Our conscience." 1933
Senate Hearings at 58.

20/

Federal Trade Commission, Rules and Regulations Under
Securities Act of 19 3 3 . Article 14 (July 6, 1933).

21/

1 SEC 364

(1936).

the
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Commission referred to several business relationships 22/ between
the accountant and the registrant and determined that the
accountant was not independent.
In response to arguments by
counsel for the accountants that the certification was not material
to investors, the Commission stated:
A certification is a material fact.
It signifies that the
contents of the financial statements to which it is appended
have been checked and verified within the limits stated in the
certificate.
To make such certification truly protective of
the
interests
of
security
holders
and
investors
the
requirement under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, is
that it be made by an "independent public or certified
accountant.” The insistence of the Act on a certification by
an "independent" accountant signifies the real function which
certification should perform. That function is the submission
to an independent and impartial mind of the accounting
practices and policies of registrants. The history of finance
well illustrates the importance and need for submission to
such impartial persons of the accounting practices and
policies of the management to the end that present and
prospective security holders will be protected against unsound
accounting practices and procedure and will be afforded, as
nearly as accounting conventions will permit, the truth about
the financial condition of the enterprise which issues the
securities.
Accordingly, the certification gives a minimum
of protection against untruths and half-truths which otherwise
would more easily creep into financial statements.
Hence a
statement which serves such a high function cannot be
dismissed under the Act as a mere "tag" attached to financial
statements.
It is a material fact, for it gives meaning and
reliability to financial data and makes less likely misleading
or untrue financial statements.23/

have

Later in the same year, the Commission found an accountant to
"consciously falsified the facts" and therefore not to be

22./

Among other things, the accounting firm received a set fee
plus one percent of the registrant's sales of certain metals
for one year. The accounting firm installed the registrant's
accounting system and furnished the registrant with office
space,
as well
as
audited
the
registrant's
financial
statements.
In addition, the person in charge of the audit
simultaneously was made com ptroller of the registrant and
owned shares of the registrant's common stock.
Id. at 365366.

23/

Id. at 367.
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independent. 24/
Commission said:

In

discussing

the

independence

issue

the

[T]he methods and results of his auditing work cause us to
doubt whether any presumption of independence, which the
absence
of
relational
or
contractual
connection
with
registrant would normally justify, can be indulged h e r e ___
[W]here the accountant has consciously falsified the facts,
as here, an inference of actual absence of independence would
seem to be justified....
Protection of investors in these
situations requires not only that these fiduciaries be free
of entangling alliances which relational and contractual
connections with registrants frequently engender, but also
that they approach their task with complete objectivity critical of the practices and procedures of registrants, and
unwilling to aid and abet in making statements which the facts
do not warrant.25/
From the very beginning, therefore, the Commission emphasized
the need for auditors to be independent.
On May 6, 1937, the
Commission issued Accounting Series Release No. ("ASR") 2. In this
release, the Commission stated:
The Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time has
been called upon to determine whether, in a particular case,
the relationship existing between a registrant and an
24/

In the Matter of American Terminals and Transit Company, 1
SEC 701, 707 (1936).

25 /

Id.
The reference by the Commission in this excerpt to the
independent accountants as "fiduciaries" is consistent with
section 11(c) the 1933 Act.
As originally enacted, this
subsection stated that the "degree of reasonableness" required
of those persons listed in section 11, including accountants
who prepare or certify any part of the registration statement,
"shall be that required of a person occupying a fiduciary
relationship.” See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
5 (1933), which states that "the essential characteristic [of
the civil liabilities imposed b y the 1933 Act] consists of a
requirement that all those responsible for statements upon the
face of which the public is solicited to invest its money
shall be held to standards like those imposed by law upon a
fiduciary." In 1934, this language was amended to state that
the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a
prudent man in the management of his own property.
See H.R.
Rep. No. 1838, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1934), which states,
"The amendment to section 11(c) [of the Securities Act of
1933] removes possible uncertainties as to the standard of
reasonableness by substituting for the present language the
accepted common law definition of the duty of a fiduciary."

10
accountant was of such a nature as to prevent him from being
considered independent for the purpose of certifying financial
statements to be filed in connection with the registration of
securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
In response to such requests, the Commission has taken the
position that an accountant can not be deemed to be
independent if he is, or has been during the period under
review, an officer or director of the registrant or if he
holds an interest in the registrant that is significant with
respect to its total capital or his own personal fortune.26/
In February 1940, the Commission consolidated several sets of
accounting instructions from various forms into a single accounting
regulation, Regulation S-X.27/
Article 2 of this Regulation was
entitled "Certification," with Rule 2 - 0 1 (b) stating that the
Commission would not recognize any accountant as independent who
is not in fact independent.
This rule further stated,
An accountant will not be considered independent with respect
to any person in whom he has any substantial interest, direct
or indirect, or with whom he is, or was during the period of
report, connected as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee,
director, officer, or employee.
With various amendments,

this rule continues today.28 /

26/

The Federal Trade Commission rule specifying that an auditor
would "not be considered” independent if certain relationships
exist, and the SEC's early use of language regarding a
"presumption" of independence, an "inference of actual absence
of independence" (In the Matter of American Terminals and
Transit Company, supra), and when an accountant "can not be
deemed" to be independent (ASR 2, supra), suggest that the
appearance
of
independence,
as
well
as
the
fact
of
independence, was a consideration in initial independence
determinations.
Subsequently, the need for auditors to
maintain the appearance of independence was written expressly
into the Commission's interpretations and the auditors'
professional literature.
See, e.g., ASR 126 (July 6, 1972),
ASR 165 (December 20, 1974), ASR 296 (August 20, 1981), and
the discussion of the AICPA's independence requirements,
infra.

27 /

ASR 12 (February 21, 1940); see SEC, Sixth Annual Report of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, at 170-171 (1940).

28/

See discussion of SEC independence requirements infra.
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The Commission continued its consideration of auditor's
independence in cases such as McKesson & Robbins. in which it
talked of the "degree of independence which [the Commission]
deem[s] necessary for the protection of investors" and described
procedural safeguards (such as the use of audit committees) that
would enhance auditor independence.29/
In this case,
the
Commission emphasized the philosophy under the Federal securities
laws that auditors are to be governed primarily by their
responsibilities
to
public
investors,
rather
than
by
any
obligations the auditors previously may have felt were owed to
management.
The Commission stated:
In approaching his work with respect to companies which file
with us or in which there is a large public interest, the
auditor must realize that, regardless of what his position and
obligations might have been when reporting to managers or
owner-managers, he must now recognize fully his responsibility
to public investors by including the activities of the
management itself within the scope of his work and by
reporting thereon to investors....
Further, the adoption of the specific recommendations made in
this report as to the type of disclosure to be made in the
accountant's certificate and as to the election of accountants
by stockholders should insure ... that accountants will be
more independent of management.30/
In the Hollander case the following year, the Commission
discussed
situations
that
"may
cast
grave
doubts
on
the
independence of an accountant."31/
In this case the Commission
also said:
[O ]ne of the purposes of requiring a certificate by an
independent public accountant is to remove the possibility of
impalpable and unprovable biases which an accountant may
unconsciously acquire because of his nonprofessional contacts
with his client.
The requirement for certification by an
independent public accountant is not so much a guarantee
against conscious falsification or intentional deception as
it is a measure to insure complete objectivity. It is in part
to protect the accounting profession from the implication that
slight carelessness or the choice of a debatable accounting
procedure is the result of bias or lack of independence that
29 /

In the Matter
1940).

of McKesson

30/

Id.

31/

In the Matter of A.
(1941).

& R o bbins. ASR

Hollander & Son,

19

(December

Inc.. 8 SEC 586,

5,

612
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this Commission has in its prior decisions adopted objective
standards.
Viewing our requirements in this light, any
inferences of a personal nature that may be directed against
specific members of the accounting profession depend upon the
facts of a particular case and do not flow from the
undifferentiated
application
of
uniform
objective
standards.32/
The Commission noted significant stockholdings by the auditors
in the Hollander companies and stated that these holdings "preclude
[the accountants] from being regarded as an independent public
accountant with respect to the r e g i s t r a n t ___ "33/
In
1944,
the
Commission
issued a
additional independence rulings, stating:

release

summarizing

Certain relationships between an accountant and his client
appear so apt to prevent the accountant from reviewing the
financial statements and accounting procedures of a registrant
with complete objectivity that the Commission has taken the
position that existence of these relationships will preclude
its finding that the accountant is, in fact, independent.3 4/

32 /

Id. at 613.

33/

Id. at 614.
AS R 22 (March 14, 1941) restated many of the
ideas in the Hollander case and reviewed other cases where
relationships and situations, beyond those set forth in Rule
2 -01(b), had prevented an accountant from being considered
independent for the purpose of certifying financial statements
filed by a particular registrant.
These situations included
being an unsalaried employee of the registrant, being a
shareholder of the registrant, being an employee of a
shareholder of the registrant, consciously falsifying facts,
being
completely
subordinate
to
the
judgments
of
the
registrant, making loans to and receiving loans from officers
and directors of the registrant, and receiving a letter of
indemnification from the registrant.

3 4/

ASR 47, "Independence of Certifying Accountants - Summary of
Past Releases of the Commission and a Compilation of Hitherto
Unpublished Cases or Inquiries Arising Under Several of the
Acts Administered by the Commission"
(January 25, 1944).
These rulings also emphasized the disqualifying aspects of
interests held by an accountant's spouse and partners in the
accounting firm.
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In addition,
in its Annual
elaborated on the importance
Commission stated, in part:

Report for 1944, the Commission
of auditor independence.35/
The

The maintenance of high standards of professional conduct on
the part of the public accountants who certify financial
statements is a matter of the utmost importance to persons who
rely on these statements. The reader of a financial statement
has a right to expect that the certifying accountant has done
his work expertly and impartially and that his opinion as to
the financial statements is forthright and unbiased....
One cornerstone of proper professional conduct is that the
accountant shall be independent of the client whose financial
statements he certifies. This view has long been held by many
individual accountants but was explicitly introduced in the
Securities Act of 1933 as a necessary prerequisite to the
certification of financial statements filed under that Act.
This need for independence has also been given statutory
recognition in the other principal acts administered by the
Commission.
The goal of such a principle is obvious--the
accountant's opinion, if it is to be valuable to the reader
of financial statements, must be arrived at objectively and
expressed impartially.
... The Commission, however, has viewed the requirement of
independence not only as a safeguard against conscious
falsification but also as a preventive of impalpable and
unprovable biases in the exercise of his professional judgment
which may arise as a result of incompatible interests or
relationships.
Consequently, the Commission has found an
accountant to be lacking in independence with respect to a
particular registrant if the relationships which exist between
the accountant and the client are such as to create a
reasonable doubt as to whether the accountant will or can have
an
impartial
and
objective
judgment
on
the
questions
confronting him.36/
During this time period, the accounting profession also
continued its consideration of auditor independence issues.
In
1947, Mr. John L. Carey, the American Institute's former chief
staff officer, wrote the following, insightful definition of
independence:
Independence is an abstract concept, and it is difficult to
define either generally or in its peculiar application to the

35./

SEC, Tenth Annual Report of
Commission. 205-207 (1944).

3 6/

Id. at 205.
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certified public accountant.
Essentially, it is a state of
mind.
It is partly synonymous with honesty, integrity,
courage, character.
It means, in simplest terms, that the
certified public accountant will tell the truth as he sees it,
and will permit no influence, financial or sentimental, to
turn hi m from that course. Everyone will applaud this ideal,
but a cynical world requires more than a mere declaration of
intention if it is to stake its money on the accountant's
word.
Therefore, the profession has laid its heaviest
penalties on those who breach the unwritten contract of
independence, and, in addition, has proscribed specific acts
and modes of behavior which might raise a question as to the
independence of its members. In other words, the rules do not
only
provide
for
punishment
of
members
who
are
not
independent; they also prohibit conduct which might arouse a
suspicion of lack of independence.
Objective standards of
independence have thus been introduced into the code.
It is
not enough for the member to do what he thinks is right.
He
must also avoid behavior which could lead to an inference that
he might be subject to improper influences.
The accounting
profession must be like Caesar's wife.
To be suspected is
almost as bad as to be convicted.37/
Over the years, the Commission has maintained the course
plotted by these early rationale.
For example, in 1964, the
Commission, in issuing a stop order under the 1933 Act, stated:
The
requirement
in Schedule A
[of the
1933
Act]
of
certification by an independent accountant is intended to
secure for the benefit of public investors the detached
objectivity of a disinterested person.
Rule 17 CFR 210.201(c) of our Regulation S-X, which sets forth the requirements
applicable to the form and content of financial statements
filed as part of a registration statement, states that in
considering the independence of certifying accountants we will
give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances,
including evidence bearing on all relationships between the
certifying accountants and the registrant or any affiliate of
registrant.
"The certifying accountant must be one who is in
no way connected with the business or its management and who
does not have any relationship that might affect the
independence which at times may require him to voice public
criticisms of his client's accounting practices."3 8 /

3 7/

John L. Carey,
(AICPA 1947).
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38/

In the Matter of South Bay Industries. Inc.. 42 SEC 83, 87
(1964), quoting American Finance Company, I n c . , 40 SEC 1043,
1049 (1962).
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ASR
296,
issued
on
August
Commission's
dedication
to
the
independence in fact and appearance.
release:

20,
1981,
reaffirmed
the
task
of
assuring
auditor
The Commission states in this

An auditor is deemed to be independent if he
in fact and if he appears to be independent.
an unbiased and objective manner and he must
financial or other interest which would create
that he may not be independent.

is independent
He must act in
be free of any
the perception

"Independent auditors should not only be independent in fact;
they should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt
their independence.” [Quoting Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 1.]
The Commission continues to endorse and require
scrupulous adherence to these principles.
The Commission
views both the fact and appearance of independence as
essential in order that the public may justifiably view the
audit process as a wholly unbiased review of management's
presentation of the corporate financial picture....
Absent
independence, in fact and appearance, investors will have
little
confidence
in
public
companies
as
investment
vehicles....
If the auditor is predisposed, or even appears
predisposed, to blindly validate management's work rather than
subjecting it to careful scrutiny, the ultimate result will
be a diminution of public confidence in the profession and the
integrity of the securities markets.
The independence of the public accountant - both in fact and
appearance - is critical to his role under the federal
securities laws.
Independence is the essential attribute of
the auditor because, absent independence, the auditor's skills
and services are of little value.
The Commission has the
responsibility and authority under the securities laws to
assure that accountants who practice before it are independent
and, therefore, is prepared to take further action if either
the fact or appearance of accountants'
independence is
questioned seriously in the future.
Three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court also emphasized the
role of the independent auditor under the Federal securities
laws.3 9 /
In finding that there is no accountant work-product
immunity for accountants' tax accrual workpapers, and no Federal
accountant-client privilege, the Court contrasted the role of the
accountant versus that of a lawyer. The court stated that a lawyer
is a confidential adviser and advocate, with a duty to present the
client's case in the most favorable light. The court then stated:

39/

United States v. Arthur Young & C o ., 465 U.S. 805

(1984).

16
An
independent
certified public
accountant
performs
a
different role.
By certifying the public reports that
collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the
independent
auditor
assumes
a
public
responsibility
transcending any employment relationship with the client. The
independent public accountant performing this special function
owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and
stockholders, as well as to the investing public.
This
"public w a t c h d o g ” function demands that the accountant
maintain total independence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public trust.
To insulate
from
disclosure
a
certified
public
accountant's
interpretations of the client's financial statements would be
to ignore the significance of the accountant's role as a
disinterested analyst charged with public obiigations.4 0 /
The Court in this case also noted that the Commission requires
that financial statements of registrants be audited "in order to
obviate the fear of loss from reliance on inaccurate information,
thereby
encouraging
public
investment
in
the
Nation's
industries."41/ The Court then emphasized the vital importance of
the appearance of an auditor's independence to the investing
public, by stating:
It is therefore not enough that financial statements be
accurate;
the public must also perceive them as being
accurate.
Public faith in the reliability of a corporation's
financial statements depends upon the public perception of the
outside auditor as an independent professional. Endowing the
workpapers of an independent auditor with a work-product
immunity
would
destroy
the
appearance
of
auditor's
independence b y creating the impression that the auditor is
an advocate for the corporate client.
If investors were to
view the auditor as an advocate for the corporate client, the
value of the audit function itself might well be lost .42/
Recent Enforcement of the Commission's Independence Requirements
From the 1936 cases of In the Matter of Cornucopia Gold Mines
and In the Matter of American Terminals and Transit Company
discussed above, to cases under investigation today, the Commission
consistently has taken and is taking enforcement and disciplinary
action when registrants and their auditors have violated the
independence requirements in the Federal securities laws.
Within
the last five years the Commission has brought such actions when,

40/

Id. at 817-818.

41/

Id. at 819 n. 15.

42/

Id.
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in its view: auditors lacked the appropriate degree of professional
skepticism when auditing clients' financial statements.43 / auditors
had financial interests in audit clients. 44/ auditors have borrowed
money, directly or indirectly, from their audit clients.45/ audit
clients had material lease arrangements with partnerships composed
of partners in the accounting firm. 46/ auditors acted as nominee
shareholders for officers or directors of audit clients,47/
auditors performed functions that should have been performed by
management, 48/ auditors assumed the incompatible role of legal
counsel for the company,49/ auditors acted as the company's
internal accountant and attempted to audit their own accounting
w o r k ,50/ auditors have been financially dependent on the audit
client,51/ and in other situations.
For example, on July 15, 1993, the Commission settled a
disciplinary proceeding pursuant to Rule 2 (e) of its Rules of

43 /

In the Matter of Fred V. Schiemann. C P A . Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Release No. ("AAER") 488 (September 29,
1993).

44/

In the Matter of D. Spencer Nilson, C P A . AAER 364 (March 31,
1992).
See also In the Matter of Bill R. Thomas. AAER 192
(May 27, 1988).

45 /

In the Matter of Robert J. Iomazzo. C P A . AAER 437 (January 12,
1993) and AAER 385 (May 22, 1992); SEC v. Ernst & Y o u n g , AAER
301 (June 13, 1991); and In the Matter of Frederick D.
Woodside, AAER 244 (August 21, 1989).

46 /

SEC v. Ernst & Y o u n g , AAER 301

47/

S EC v. Superior Resources. Inc., et a l . , AAER 419
22, 1992).

48/

In the Matter of Michael R. Ford.
1991) and AAER 297 (May 6, 1991).

49 /

In the Matter of Samuel George Greenspan. CP A , AAER
(August 26, 1991) and AAER 298 (May 23, 1991).

5 0/

In the Matter of Thomas P. Reynolds. LTD. and Milton A.
Netcher. AAER 333 (September 16, 1991); In the Matter of
Terrance M. W a h l , AAER 321 (September 30, 1991); and In the
Matter of Noemi L. Rodriquez Santos, AAER 246 (September 1,
1989).

51/

In the Matter of Bernard Taraowsky, AAER 467 (July 15, 1993)
and In the Matter of Terrance M. W a h l . AAER 321 (September 30,
1991).

(June 13, 1991).

C P A . AAER 302

(September

(June 17,
312
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Practice 52/ in which the auditor was alleged to have violated the
Commission's
independence
requirements
by
being
financially
dependent on the registrant and making decisions normally made by
company employees.5 3 / The Commission determined that the auditor
in this case derived approximately seventy-five percent of his
annual income from the registrant, which was the auditor's only
audit client.
The Commission also found that the auditor was the
registrant's sole source of expert advice on accounting matters and
that the auditor, rather than the registrant's employees, made
certain decisions regarding the preparation of the registrant's
financial statements.
The auditor was denied the privilege of
practicing before the Commission with the right to apply for
permission to resume such practice after 18 months and the
fulfillment of certain specified conditions.
In another recent case, the Commission found that an auditor
was not independent because of certain loans he had received from
his audit client.54 / The Commission ordered that this auditor be

52/

17 CFR §201.2(e).

53 /

In the Matter of Bernard Tarnowskv, AAER 467 (July 15, 1993).

54 /

In the Matter of Robert J. Iommazzo, C P A . AAER 437 (January
12, 1993).
In related private litigation, the court, ruling
on defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be gran ted amd failure to
plead fraud with particularity, stated that the allegation
that an "auditor working in a secondary review capacity had
owed outstanding debts to [the thrift] ... fuels plaintiffs'
contention that the [thrift] defendants an d [the accounting
firm] engaged in a joint attempt to fraudulently inflate the
price of [the thrift's] stock."
Lerch v. Citizens First
Bancorp., I n c ., et a l ., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶97,258, at page 95,171 (D.N.J. 1992). The court further held
that plaintiffs' complaint plead fraud in sufficient detail
by, among other things,
"explaining the context of [the
accounting firm's] sending as one of its auditors of [the
thrift] an individual in default of substan tial money to [the
thrift]." Id.
The court noted:
First of all, it is undisputed that Robert Iamuzzo (sic),
[the accounting firm's] auditor working in a secondary
capacity on [the thrift's] audit, was indebted to [the
thrift] for millions of dollars.
If [the accounting
firm] knew of this indebtedness, then it clearly did
violate the requirement that am auditor be independent.
Moreover, once such a suspicious scenario is alleged, it
is perfectly reasonable to inquire, through discovery,
about the extent of the relationship between [the thrift]
(continued...)
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denied for a period of ten years the privilege of appearing before
the Commission as an independent public accountant, and denied for
a period of five years the privilege of appearing before the
Commission as a preparer of financial statements. The Commission's
opinion in this case stated:
[I]
n d e p e n d e n c e of public accountants is critical to the
Commission's reporting process and to the securities markets
which the Commission regulates.
The entire framework of the
federal securities laws is premised on fair and adequate
disclosure
of material
facts.
Audits
by
independent
accountants are an important method by which the disclosure
requirements are implemented.
As the Commission previously
has said, "The Commission has historically considered the
independence of the auditors who examine financial statements
filed with the Commission as central to the effective
implementation of the federal securities l a w s .” [Quoting ASR
296.]
Audit reports by independent accountants "provide the
assurance of an outside expert's examination and opinion,
thereby substantially increasing, the reliability of financial
statements."
[Quoting ASR 165.]
These cases are typical of the Commission's strong, persistent
enforcement presence in the area of auditor independence.
While the Commission has adequate statutory authority to
maintain these efforts, certain pending legislative initiatives
could serve to strengthen the Commission's enforcement program
regarding auditor independence as well as other areas of fraudulent
financial reporting. For example, current legislative initiatives
by Congressmen Markey, Dingell, and Wyden, Senator Kerry, and
others, further may enhance auditor independence by providing
auditors with the means, and requiring auditors under penalty of
law, to report directly to the Commission certain uncorrected
illegal acts by their audit clients.55/ This legislation also may
5 4 / (...continued)
and [the accounting firm], particularly between [the
thrift] and any particular employees of [the accounting
firm].
Id. at n. 12, pages 95,171-95,172.
5 5/

H.R. 574, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), and S. 630, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), would require each audit under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include, "in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, as may be modified
or supplemented from time to time by the Commission,"
procedures regarding the detection of certain illegal acts,
procedures for the identification of certain related party
(continued...)
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have broader enforcement implications.
In another vein, the
Commission has sought an exemption from the asserted application
of certain procurement requirements to its engagement of expert
witnesses to testify in auditor independence and other cases. Such
an exemption would clarify the Commission's contracting authority,
facilitate the retention of the most credible witnesses to support
the Commission's cases, and avoid the risk of premature disclosure
of the staff's litigation theory and strategies.
The staff
encourages continued consideration of a statutory exemption in this
area.
Disclosure Requirements
In addition to considering independence from an enforcement
and interpretive vantage point, over the years the Commission has
undertaken several rulemaking proceedings that have had the effect
of
strengthening
auditors'
independence.
Examples
include
disclosures related to the use of audit committees, the resignation
or dismissal of a registrant's primary auditor, and the auditor's
provision of management advisory services.56/
Audit Committees.
The Commission historically has encouraged the use of audit
committees composed of independent d i r e c t o r s . 57/
A n effective

(...continued)
/
5
transactions, and an evaluation regarding the registrant's
ability to continue as a going concern.
These bills also
would require a registrant to notify the Commission within one
business day after its auditor reports to the registrant's
board of directors that the auditor reasonably expects either
to resign or to qualify its audit report due to an illegal
act, committed b y the registrant, that has a material effect
on the registrant's financial statements.
If the registrant
would fail to notify the Commission that the board of
directors received such an "illegal acts report" from its
auditor, then the auditor, within the next business day, would
be required to provide a copy of that illegal acts report
directly to the Commission.
56/

Additional proxy statement disclosures, whenever there is to
be an election of directors or the election, approval, or
ratification of the auditors, include whether the auditors
will attend the shareholders' meeting and have the opportunity
to make a statement, and whether the auditors will be
available to respond to questions at that meeting.
Item 9,
S c h e d u le

57 /

14 A ,

17

CFR

2 4 0 .1 4 a - 1 0 1 .

See In the Matter of McKesson & R obbins, I n c ., supra; and ASR
123 (March 23, 1972).
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audit committee may enhance the auditor's independence by, among
other things, providing a forum apart from management where the
auditors may discuss their concerns, recommending or approving the
selection
of
the
independent
auditors,
and
facilitating
communications among the Board of Directors, management, and
internal and independent auditors.58/
Accordingly, the Commission requires disclosure, in connection
with the solicitation of proxies, of information concerning an
audit committee's members, functions, and number of meetings.59/
Additional information that must be disclosed regarding audit
committees
includes
whether a
registrant's
audit
committee
recommended or approved a change in accountants, and whether the
audit committee consulted with the former accountant concerning
disagreements with management and certain other matters.60/
Also, pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking and oversight
authority, the Commission has approved the national securities
exchanges' various audit committee requirements.
Currently, the
New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Board Options Exchange
require listed companies to have audit committees composed entirely
of
independent
directors.61/
The National
Association of

58/

See SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Report on
Corporate Accountability, printed for the use of the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 486-510 (1980); Securities and Exchange
Commission Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and
the Commission's Oversight Role, Prepared for the Subcommittee
on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 96-101 (1978); Letter from SEC Chairman David S. Ruder
to Mr. Joseph R. Hardiman, President, National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (December 7, 1988). See a l s o ,Report
of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
at 41-42 and Appendix I, "Good Practice Guidelines for the
Audit Committee" (October 1987), and J. Bacon, The Audit
Committee: A Broader Mandate (a research report prepared for
The Conference Board, 1988).

59/

Item 7(e) of Schedule 14A, 17 CFR 240.14a-101.

60/

Item 304 of Regulation S-K, 17
Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.304.

61/

The original petition by the Chicago Board Options Exchange
("CBOE")
contained a recommendation that listed issuers
maintain audit committees composed of independent directors.
The final rules were strengthened to require all listed
issuers to maintain such committees. Exchange Act Release No.
(continued...)
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Securities Dealers, with respect to all national market system
companies, the American Stock Exchange, with limited exceptions,
and the Chicago Stock Exchange, with respect to all companies,
require that listed companies have audit committees with a majority
of independent directors.
Auditor Resignation or Dismissal.
Since the early 1970s, the Commission has required disclosures
that have discouraged the practice of changing auditors to obtain
more favorable accounting treatment.62/ and provided a forum for
the auditor, upon leaving the audit engagement.63/ to note material
events and disagreements with management that may not have been
disclosed by the registrant.
In 1971, the Commission first proposed that registrants
disclose whenever a new principal auditor was engaged and "the
reasons for the change" in auditors.64/
Commentators, however,
objected to stating in each instance the "reasons for the change"
in
auditors,
and
the
adopted
disclosure
was
limited
to
"disagreements" between the auditor and the registrant that are
related
to
the
purposes
of
the
Federal
securities
laws.
Specifically, disclosure was required of:
any disagreements with the former principal accountant on any
matter of accounting principles or practices,
financial
statement
disclosure,
or
auditing
procedure,
which
6 1 / (...continued)
28556 (October 19, 1990)
[55 FR 43233].
The Commission
release states, "The Commission
believes that independent
audit committees should enhance the reliability of financial
disclosures and the credibility of financial information."
Id. at 55 FR 43237.
62/

ASR 165, supra.

63/

In an ongoing auditor-client relationship the auditor may
publicize its material concerns regarding the financial
statements in a modified audit report.
When the auditor
resigns or is dismissed before a current audit report is
issued, however, that opportunity to alert the public is not
available.
The Commission's regulations fill this gap by
providing a reporting mechanism upon the change in a
registrant's independent accountants.

64/

Exchange Act Release No. 9169 (May 6, 1971). In this release,
the Commission noted that it was considering whether the
registrant's statement of the reason for the change and the
letter from the former accountant should be made public or
treated as non-public.
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disagreements if not resolved to the satisfaction of the
former accountant would have caused him to make reference in
connection with his opinion to the subject matter of the
disagreement.65/
These disclosure requirements have been amended on several
occasions.
For example, in 1974 the Commission extended the
disclosure requirement to:
(1) be triggered also by (i) the
resignation or dismissal of the principal accountants or their
declination to stand for re-election after completion of the
current audit (previously, disclosure was required only upon the
engagement of a new auditor) and (ii) changes in the independent
accountants for significant subsidiaries on whom the principal
accountant expressed reliance in its audit report, (2) include a
statement regarding whether the audit reports for either of the
last two years contained an adverse opinion or a disclaimer of
opinion, (3) cover changes in accountants during the two most
recent fiscal years (the previous period was eighteen months), (4)
include
a
description
of
all
disagreements,
even
those
disagreements that have been resolved to the former accountant's
satisfaction,
and
(5)
construe the definition of the term
"disagreements" broadly to include, among other things, situations
where the accountant has advised the registrant that either the
registrant lacks sufficient internal controls necessary to develop
reliable financial statements or the accountant has discovered
facts that have led the accountant to be willing no longer to rely
on
management's
representations
or
to
be
associated
with
management's financial statements.66/
6 5/

Exchange
Act
Release
No.
9344
(September
27,
1971).
Approximately seven years later, the Commission reconsidered
whether to require disclosure of the "reasons for all changes
in independent accountants” rather than disclosure of only
"disagreements." ASR 247 (May 26, 1978). Commentators again
opposed this disclosure for a variety of reasons, arguing that
the disclosure would not be useful and that meaningful
information would not be presented.
These commentators
indicated that disclosure would be boiler-plate (for example,
"auditor rotation policy," "need a fresh look," "poor
service,” or "high fees”) , that such disclosures would obscure
the disclosure of disagreements then required, and that candid
disclosures would not be made for fear of litigation involving
libel or other allegations.
They also argued that the
proposal might tend to inhibit changes in accountants.
The
Commission stated that it did not endorse all the arguments
made by the commentators.
Nonetheless, disclosure of the
reasons for all changes in accountants was not adopted.
Id.

66/

ASR 165, supra, which states:
(continued...)
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In April
1988,
the
Commission
further
expanded
these
disclosures
to
include
certain
potential
opinion
shopping
situations, to clarify the circumstances in which registrants are
deemed to have had disclosable disagreements with their former
accountants, and to require disclosure of both "reportable events" 67/
and certain issues the registrant discussed with the newly engaged
auditor prior to the date of engagement.68/
Currently, item 304 of Regulation S-K contains the substantive
disclosure requirements concerning changes in a registrant's
certifying accountant .69/ Although this item is incorporated into
several forms and reports.70/ the disclosure generally is made
under Item 4 of Form 8-K 71/ due to the requirement that this form
must be filed within five business days after the resignation,
6 6 /(...continued)
It is essential that both the fact and the appearance of
independence be sustained so that the confidence of the
investing public in the reliability of audited financial
statements and the integrity of the public accounting
profession will be maintained.
To this end,
the
Commission has concluded that it is desirable to increase
the level of disclosure regarding the relationships
between independent accountants and their clients.
6 7/

Reportable events involve situations where the accountant has
advised the registrant that it: questions the reliability of
the
registrant's
financial
statements
or
management's
representations; believes that sufficient internal controls
do not exist to develop reliable financial statements; needs
to expand the scope of the audit to investigate certain
matters; or, has concluded that certain information that has
come to its attention materially impacts the fairness or
reliability of current or past audit reports or the financial
statements underlying those reports.
See item 304( a ) (1)(v)
of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.304(a)(1)(v).

68/

Financial Reporting Release No.

69/

17 CFR 229.304.
Substantially the same disclosures are
required of small business
issuers under item 304 of
Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.304.

70 /

Item 304, Regulation S-K, information is required by Forms S1, S-2, S-4, and S- 11 under the Securities Act of 1933 and
Forms 10 and 1 0 -K and Schedule 14A under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
Item 304, Regulation S-B, information
is required by Forms SB-1, SB-2, 10-SB, and 10-KSB.

71/

17 CFR 249.308.

("FRR") 31 (April 12, 1988).
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dismissal, or declination of the former accountant to stand for reelection, or the engagement of a new certifying accountant.72/
As noted above, item 304(a) disclosures include, among other
things: whether the former accountant resigned, declined to stand
for re-election, or was dismissed, and the date thereof; whether
the former accountant qualified his or her audit report or
disclaimed an opinion during the past two years; whether the change
in accountants was approved by the audit committee or the board of
directors; and whether in connection with the audits of the two
most recent fiscal years (plus any subsequent interim period) there
were
any
"reportable
events"
or
disagreements
concerning
accounting, auditing, or financial disclosure issues, which, if not
resolved, would have caused the auditor to refer to the issue in
connection with its report.
The registrant currently is required to provide the accountant
with a copy of the Form 8-K no later than the day the Form 8-K is
filed with the Commission, along with a request to provide the
registrant with a letter (addressed to the Commission) that the
registrant must file as an exhibit to that Form 8-K.7 3 /
In that
letter, the accountant should state whether he or she agrees with
the registrant's disclosure and, if not, the respects in which he
or she does not agree.
As noted above, under the 1988 amendments
to the item 304(a),
certain issues discussed with the new
accountant also must be disclosed.
When this occurs, the new
accountant is provided the opportunity to review these disclosures
and submit to the registrant a letter (addressed to the Commission
and to be filed as an exhibit to the Form 8-K) clarifying the
registrant's expression of the accountant's views, providing new
information, or stating the respects in which the accountant
disagrees with the registrant's disclosure.7 4 /

72/

In FRR 34 (March 2, 1989), the Commission accelerated the
timing for filing Forms 8-K related to changes in registrants'
independent accountants to five business days from 15 calendar
days.

73/

Under item 304(a) (3) of Regulation S-K (and Regulation S - B ) ,
if the accountant's letter is unavailable at the time the Form
8-K is filed, the registrant must request that the accountant
provide the letter as soon as possible, so that the registrant
may file the letter with the Commission within ten business
days after the registrant files the Form 8-K with the
Commission. Notwithstanding this ten business day period, the
registrant must
file the accountant's letter with the
Commission within two business days of receipt.
See FRR 34,
supra, in which the Commission reduced the relevant time
period from 30 calendar days to ten business days.

74/

Item 30 4 ( a ) (2)(D) of Regulation S-K (and Regulation S - B ) .
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A disagreement with the former accountant reported under Item
304(a) raises a "red flag" for shareholders, investors, and the
Commission staff 75/ that the accounting, auditing, or disclosure
issue was of such importance that, had it not been resolved to the
accountant's
satisfaction,
it would have been mentioned in
connection with the auditor's report.
It also triggers both
additional disclosures pursuant to Item 304(b) of Regulation S-K 76 /
and
disclosure
of
any discussions
with the
newly engaged
accountants that occurred prior to their engagement and concerned
the subject of the disagreement.77/
Subsequent to the Commission's 1989 revisions to accelerate
the timing requirements for filing Forms 8-K regarding changes in
registrants' certifying accountants.78/ the SEC Practice Section
("SECPS")
of
the
American
Institute
of
Certified
Public
Accountants'
("AICPA")
Division
for
CPA
Firms,
with
the
encouragement of the Commission, adopted a membership requirement
for its members to send a letter to the Commission's Office of the

75/

The Division of Corporation Finance commences a full review
of all incoming Forms 8-K indicating a change of auditor no
later than the first day following the date they are received
by the Division's branches.
This review may result in a
referral to the Division of Enforcement, examination of the
current or next financial statements on a high priority basis,
or disposition according to the routine comment process. The
Division of Enforcement also conducts a general review of
Forms 8-K indicating a change of auditor and makes appropriate
inquiries when it receives referrals on these matters from the
Division of Corporation Finance.

76/

17 CFR 229.304(b).
This disclosure includes the former
accountant's
opinion as to what the accounting for a
particular transaction or event should have been, if it
differs
from
the
accounting
being
followed
for
that
transaction by the registrant.

7 7/

Disclosure also is required of communications with the newly
engaged accountant if those communications were subject to
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 5 0 , "Reports on the
Application of Accounting Principles" (July 1986).
This
statement establishes performance and reporting standards to
be used when accountants provide written reports (or oral
advice in certain circumstances) to non-audit clients on the
application of generally accepted accounting principles or the
type of opinion that may be rendered on a specific entity's
financial statements.
See, FRR 31, supra.

7 8/

FRR 34, supra.
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Chief Accountant when a change in accountants occurs.79/
This
membership requirement became effective May 1, 1989.
The SECPS
letter is intended to alert the Commission staff that the SEC Form
8-K system for reporting a change in accountants has been
triggered.80/
Management Advisory Services.
As noted previously, accounting firms have provided management
advisory services ("MAS" or "non-audit services") 81/ to audit
clients for decades, predating the enactment of the Federal
securities laws. Revenues from these services are a significant
part of the major accounting firms' revenues.82/
Whether the performance of MAS by auditors has an impact on
auditor independence is a legitimate concern.
Because of this
concern, the Commission, in 1978, adopted a proxy disclosure

79/

On January 9, 1990, the AICPA announced that its membership
had voted to make SECPS membership mandatory for its members
with SEC audit clients.
Under the new provision, if a firm
with an SEC audit client does not join the SECPS, the firm's
partners will be expelled from the AICPA.
According to the
SECPS Annual Report for the year ended June 30, 1992, there
are 1,203 SECPS member firms, 789 of whom are auditors to
14,643 SEC registrants.
SEC Practice Section,
Public
Oversight Board, Combined Annual Report; Year Ended June 30,
1992. at 18 and 26.
The remaining 414 SECPS member firms do
not have SEC audit clients. Id. The SEC staff has estimated
that approximately 300 small accounting firms practicing
before the Commission (auditors to an estimated 500 public
companies) currently are not SECPS members.

80/

For a discussion of legislative initiatives that would apply
to changes in accountants, see the discussion of H.R. 574 in
Re cen t ___Enforcement
of
the
Commission's___ Indepe ndence
Requirem ents , supra.

81/

The work of accounting firms generally is broken down for
statistical purposes into three categories: accounting and
auditing, tax, and MAS.

8 2/

Five of the six largest accounting firms derive from 20 to 28
percent of their total U.S. net revenues from the provision
of MAS. Over 44 percent of the remaining firm's U.S. revenues
come from MAS.
Public Accounting Report, at 1 ( M a r c h 3 1 ,
1993). Approximately 20 to 27 percent of the six firms' U.S.
revenues are provided by tax services, with the remainder
coming from accounting and auditing services.
Id.
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requirement related to such services.83/ This disclosure described
each non-audit service provided by the auditor.
It also included
a statement of the percentage of the fees for all non-audit
services to total audit fees, the percentage of the fee for each
non-audit service to total audit fees, and a statement whether each
non-audit service was considered and approved by the audit
committee of the board of directors or b y the board.
Further, the
Commission published an interpretive release 84/ describing certain
factors that independent accountants, audit committees, boards of
directors, and managements should consider in determining whether
the independent accountants should be engaged to perform non-audit
services.
These factors included the auditor's dependence on MAS
fees, the possibility of auditors supplanting management's role in
making corporate decisions, the possibility of creating a situation
where an auditor may be required to review his or her own work, and
the relation of the MAS activity to accounting and auditing skills.
The interpretive release also recognized, however, the potential
economic benefits to the corporation, and the potential increased
audit quality, that m a y result from the auditor's gaining a greater
understanding of the corporation's business through the performance
of MAS.
The reaction to the Commission disclosure requirement and
interpretive release was unexpectedly severe.
The interpretive
release contained a request for comments on the factors set forth
in the release and on the experience of the profession and the
corporate community in applying them to concrete fact patterns.
Accounting
firms responded to the request for comments by
indicating that the disclosure requirement and interpretive release
had resulted in an unwarranted curtailment of non-audit services.
They stated that (1) the Commission appeared to be deprecating the
benefits that may inure to corporations by having MAS performed by

83/

ASR 250 (June 29, 1978). Prior to the implementation of this
disclosure requirement, a private commission established by
the AICPA (The Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities, also
known as the "Cohen Commission") reviewed the performance of
MAS by auditors.
The Cohen Commission found that outside of
executive search and placement services there was no evidence
that the performance of MAS compromised auditor independence.
In spite of this finding, the Cohen Commission urged the
accounting profession to take steps to diminish the concerns
of
a
"significant minority” and
recommended
that
the
performance of non-audit services be evaluated by audit
committees or boards of directors, and that registrants or
auditors appropriately disclose such services. The Commission

on

Auditors'

R esponsibilities:

Recommendations. 100-104
AICPA, 1978).
8 4/

ASR 264

(June 14, 1979).

Report,

Conclusions, a nd

(a research study prepared for the
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their independent accountants.85/
(2)
it appeared that the
Commission might question the independence of an auditor based
solely on the percentage relationships between audit and non-audit
services disclosed in the proxy statements, and (3) there was
confusion as to whether the Commission was concerned with all n o n 
audit services (including tax services) or only MAS.
It also was
revealed that some registrants apparently had set arbitrary maximum
percentage fee limits on the amount of non-audit services that
could be provided by their independent accountants.
These
companies reportedly were deciding whether to engage their auditors
for MAS activities based on these maximum fee limits, and were not
considering the more important issues regarding the nature of the
proposed services and their possible impact on the accountant's
independence.
Mindful of these reactions to the disclosure rule and
interpretive release, the Commission studied the 1979, 1980, and
1981 proxy disclosures. Approximately 1,200 proxy statements were
reviewed. Of those reviewed, approximately 91 percent in 1979 and
92 percent in 1980 disclosed that the independent accountants had
been engaged for some type of non-audit service, with the most
frequently disclosed services being in tax related areas.8 6 / Few
of the registrants reported that their independent accountants had
performed the services the Commission had mentioned as being
particularly sensitive, such as consumer surveys, plant layout, and
actuarial services. The Commission also reviewed the magnitude of
fees for non-audit services in relation to audit fees, and found
the following:
Percentage relationships of
fees for non-audit services
______ to audit fees_________
0 26 51 Over

Percentage of companies
______ in the sample_____
19 79
1980
74%
68%
15%
22%
7%
8%
3%
3%

25%
50%
100%
100%

Proxy disclosures in this sample also revealed that the percentage
of companies having audit committees increased from 81.7 percent
in 1979, to 84 percent in 1980, and 86.4 percent in 1981.
The
survey further revealed that in 1980, 50.7 percent of the audit
committees approved each MAS service.
In 1981, this percentage
rose to 53.9.
In 1980, 84.9 percent of all companies had no
85/

In ASR 264, supra, however,
recognized such benefits.

the

Commission

specifically

86/

As noted elsewhere, however, the provision of tax services
generally is considered to be a separate category of service,
apart from MAS.
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employee directors serving on audit committees.
rose to 86.9 in 1981.

This percentage

In addition to reviewing the required proxy disclosures, the
Commission monitored the efforts taken by others in this area. For
example, the Commission noted that the SECPS required its members
to report total MAS fees to the audit committee or board of
directors of each SEC audit client, and to describe the types of
services rendered.
The SECPS and the Public Oversight Board
("POB") 8 7/ also indicated that they would monitor MAS through the
profession's peer review program and "comment ... if the magnitude
of [MAS] appears to increase to an extent that it threatens
professional
image
generally."88/
Finally,
the
Commission
recognized that summarized information,
similar to what
is
presented in the table on page 32, regarding the relationship
between MAS and audit fees was provided to the SECPS by member
firms and was publicly available.
Although the Commission's concerns regarding the provision of
MAS remained unchanged, based on, among other things: (1) the
unexpected reaction to the proxy disclosure requirement and the
Commission's interpretive release and the arbitrary limitation of
non-audit services being performed by auditors based on the amounts
of fees for such services rather than the nature of the services
rendered, (2) the proxy survey that indicated (i) audit committees
consisting principally of non-employee directors actively were
reviewing MAS activities and (ii) auditors generally were not
performing those services believed to have an impact on their
independence, and (3) the actions taken by the private sector to
monitor MAS and make information regarding those services publicly
available,
the Commission determined to rescind the formal

87/

Because the peer review process for public companies is
performed and administered by the accounting profession, the
AICPA, when it was developing the peer review program in 1977,
determined that public confidence in the process would be
increased if an independent board composed of prominent
individuals oversaw and reported on the peer review program.
The POB was created to serve this purpose.
Today, the POB
also reports on other matters bearing on the integrity of the
audit process.
The POB, whose activities are funded by the
AICPA, maintains its independence from the AICPA by selecting
its members and staff,
setting their compensation,
and
choosing the POB Chairman.
The current Chairman of the five
member board is A.A. Sommer, a former SEC Commissioner.

88/

1979-1980 Annual Report of the Public Oversight Board, at 22.
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interpretive
release
requirement.90/

89/

89/

and

the

MAS

proxy

disclosure

In withdrawing the interpretive release,
the Commission
reaffirmed its views regarding the need for caution in the
provision of MAS.
The Commission stated, in part:
Although the Commission's views expressed in
[the
interpretive release] are unchanged and registrants and
accountants must continue to carefully evaluate their
relationships to ensure that the public maintains
confidence in the integrity of financial reporting, the
Commission is withdrawing that release because it may
confuse independent accountants, audit committees and
others who are trying to evaluate services performed or
to be performed by the accountants.
Moreover, the
Commission believes it has achieved its objective in
issuing [the interpretive release].
Accountants and
their self-regulatory structure, audit committees, boards
of
directors
and
managements
are
aware
of
the
Commission's views on accountants'
independence and
should
be
sensitive
to
the
possible
impact
on
independence
of
nonaudit
services
performed
by
accountants.
The Commission believes it should be able
to rely on these persons to ensure adequate consideration
of the impact on accountants' independence of nonaudit
services because they share the responsibility to assure
the public maintains confidence in the independence of
accountants.
ASR 296, supra.

90/

Id.; ASR 297 (August 20, 1981); and ASR 304 (January 28,
1982).
Approximately two-thirds of the 140 commentators
expressed support for the rescission of the MAS proxy
disclosure requirement.
The commentators suggesting that
rescission was not appropriate made two basic arguments. The
first argument was that accounting firms providing computer
or actuarial services to their audit clients would not be
independent because they would audit the systems they design,
develop,
and implement.
The second argument was that
rescission would provide accounting firms with an unfair
competitive advantage that would threaten the existence of
computer and actuarial service companies. The second argument
was rejected by the Commission because it felt that the
retention of a disclosure requirement simply to affect
competition in the consulting industry would be considered an
inappropriate use of the Commission's statutory authority.
The first argument was reviewed in light of the information
discussed above and the absence of evidence that (1) investors
(continued...)
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The public accounting firms that are members of the SECPS
continue to provide the summarized information concerning the level
of MAS activities. The SECPS also has adopted certain restrictions
regarding types of MAS services that would impair an auditor's
independence, if provided to an audit client.
In this regard,
SECPS membership requirements currently prohibit
firms from
performing services for their audit clients such as psychological
testing, public opinion polls, merger and acquisition assistance
for a finder's fee, executive recruitment services, and certain
actuarial services to insurance companies.91/
These membership
requirements also provide for member firms to report annually,
among other things, the number of audit clients for which MAS is
performed within various percentage ranges.92/
Information
included in the SECPS/POB Combined Annual Report for the Year Ended
June 30, 199293/ indicates the following levels of MAS services:
Percentage Relationships of
fees for non-audit services
______ to audit fees_________
0%
1-25%
26-50%
51-100%
over 100%

Percentage of companies
______ in the range______
80.2%
15.9%
1.8%
1.1%
1.0%

When these percentage relationships are compared with those
derived in 1979 and 1980, as set forth above, it appears that the
percentage of SEC audit clients receiving significant MAS services
may have fallen.
For example, in 1980, fees from non-audit
services were from 0 to 25% of the audit fee for 74% of the
surveyed companies. According to the 1992 POB report, 96.1% (80.2%
+ 15.9%) of the SEC registrants whose financial statements are
audited by SECPS members would fall into this category.

90/(...continued)
wanted or used the disclosed information and (2) performance
of
MAS
impaired
auditors'
independence.
After
full
consideration, the Commission rescinded the proxy disclosure
requirement. I d .
9 1/

Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC Practice
Section of the AICPA Division for Firms, Section IV.

92 /

Id .

93/

SEC Practice Section, Public Oversight Board, Combined Annual
Report, Year Ended June 30, 1 9 9 2 , at 18.
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The staff also monitors the level of MAS activity provided to
audit clients through other means.
For example, Accounting Today
annually publishes information on the "Top 60” accounting firms.94/
This information indicates that the level of MAS fees for the six
largest accounting firms, measured as a percentage of the overall
fees received by each firm, from 1991 to 1993 is as follows:
Firm
Arthur Andersen
Ernst & Young
Deloitte & Touche
KPMG Peat Marwick
Coopers & Lybrand
Price Waterhouse

1991

1993

44%
23
18
20
25
28

46%
26
23
15
25
30

The 1993 Accounting Today "Top 60" report also indicates that
from 1992 to 1993 the percentage of aggregate fees attributable to
MAS work to total revenues for both the six largest accounting
firms and the top 60 firms remained steady at 28.9%.
By way of
comparison, this report indicates that in 1989 MAS fees for the top
60 firms were 24.1%, and for the top six firms they were 25.4%, of
total fees received.95/
The percentages reflected in the "Top 60" report include fees
for MAS, and total revenues for services, provided to both SEC
audit clients and all other parties.
Combining the statistics in
the POB report with those in the Top 60 report may indicate that,
although over time there has been an increase in MAS services, much
of that increase may be for parties other than SEC audit clients.
Today, the SEC staff generally does not object to the
provision of MAS to audit clients provided the services do not
result in the accounting firm's auditing its own work, making
decisions for management of the client, or recovering client
assets, for example collecting past-due accounts receivable.
For
example, the staff has raised independence issues where the auditor
performed certain valuation services and feasibility studies, or
prepared financial forecasts,
or functioned in a management
capacity.
In these cases, the client presumably would rely on the
auditor's work to make business decisions and the auditor would
have to review the outcome of those decisions as part of the audit.
The nature of MAS provided by accountants continues to change
and expand.
Large-scale information systems implementation and
integration and litigation support engagements are becoming more
9 4/

Accounting T o d a y . "The Sixth Annual Top 60;
supplement to the December 13, 1993 edition).

95/

Id.

1993,"

(a
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common. Although it appears that the significant majority of these
services are performed for parties other than SEC audit clients,
the staff is mindful of the potential impact of MAS on auditors'
independence,
in light of the increasing role of non-audit
personnel (who are not bound by the accounting profession's Code
of Ethics) at the top management levels of the firms, the need for
capital to finance growth in areas such as computer system
installation services, and the increasing possibility of firms
offering services that are incompatible with the audit function.
The staff will continue to be alert to the development of problems
of independence that ma y be caused by M A S .
The lack of an
apparent, dramatic increase in MAS provided to SEC audit clients,
however, suggests that a fundamental change in the Commission's
regulations is not necessary at this time.
Client Advocacy.
In addition to the numerous independence issues that surround
the conduct of an audit, the SEC staff is concerned that certain
accounting firms m a y have compromised their objectivity with
respect to proposed or actual client accounting treatments with the
SEC staff.
The Commission staff wishes to stress that the number
of instances in which questionable client advocacy has been
established is very small in relation to the number of audited
financial statements filed with the Commission.
The staff
continues to believe that the vast majority of audits are conducted
in an appropriately skeptical manner.
The staff also appreciates
that reasonable people may come to different conclusions on
accounting issues and, in good faith, hold and represent views that
differ from those of the staff. The OCA encourages registrants and
their auditors to discuss and resolve financial accounting and
reporting issues with the staff.
A different situation arises,
however, when high levels of authority within major accounting
firms appear to argue unfounded positions before the staff.96/
Some of these instances cause the staff to question the appearance
of auditor independence.
The staff believes that these events raise questions about
whether the auditor has maintained an appropriate relationship to
his or her audit client.
The staff recognizes, however, that the
problem of an appearance of
"client advocacy” may not be
susceptible
to
correction
through
additional,
objective
independence interpretations or rules.
The current sanction for
this type of conduct is a possible reduction in credibility before
the public on the accounting issue being considered.
This is a
serious sanction, indeed. To prevent such a loss of confidence in
a firm's views, the firm, when accompanying audit clients to

96/

See generally, address by Chief Accountant Walter P. Schuetze,
AICPA Twenty-first Annual National Conference on Current SEC
Developments (January 11, 1994).
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meetings
with
the
Commission
staff
or
providing
written
substantiation
for
the proposed accounting,
should present
positions that are well-founded in, or logical extensions of,
authoritative accounting literature.97/
As in all areas of independence, the auditor should remember
that his or her duty to the public overrides any responsibility
owed to the audit client.
The first definition of "client" in
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary is "a person under the
protection of another.” Clearly, the investing public looks to the
auditor for comfort regarding the reliability of registrants'
financial statements 98/ and the public, not the company paying
the
firm's
fee,
must be
the true
"client"
of
the
firm.
Accordingly, any "advocacy” by the firm should be in support of
positions that are intended to benefit and protect investors and
the public.
III.

SEC RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS

Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X
As previously noted, the Federal Trade Commission, prior to
the formation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopted
the first rule implementing the statutory requirement that auditors
must be independent of registrants that file audited financial
statements pursuant to the Federal securities laws.9 9 / This rule

97/

The staff recognizes that the complexity of some accounting
standards and, in some instances, the lack of concise,
workable definitions of accounting terms may contribute to
this problem. The staff has encouraged standards-setters, to
the
extent
practicable,
to
adopt
simple,
bright-line
accounting principles and auditing standards.
See, e . g . ,
Testimony of William R. McLucas, Director, Division of
Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Before
the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on
Banking,
Housing,
and Urban Affairs,
Concerning Private
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, at 10 n.15 (June
17, 1993).

98/

S e e / United States v. Arthur Young, supra.

99/

See Background in part I of this study for a discussion of
the evolution of the Commission's independence requirements.
The Federal Trade Commission rule stated, in part:
The Commission will not recognize any such certified
accountant or public accountant as independent if such
accountant is not in fact independent.
Unless the
Commission otherwise directs, such accountant will not
(continued__ )
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initially was incorporated into the SEC's registration forms and
in February 1940, when the Commission centralized many of its
accounting requirements in one regulation, into Rule 2-01 of
Regulation S-X.100/
As then adopted,
Rule 2-01,
entitled
"Qualifications of Accountants,” stated that the Commission would
not recognize any accountant as a certified public accountant or
as a public accountant who was not duly registered, in good
standing, and entitled to practice in the place of the accountant's
residence or principal office.
The rule also stated that the
Commission would not recognize any accountant as independent who
was not in fact independent, and then set forth situations where
an accountant would "not be considered" independent.
These
situations included those where the accountant had any direct or
indirect substantial interest in the registrant or was connected
with the registrant as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee,
director, officer, or employee.101/
Over the years, Rule 2-01 has been amended on several
occasions.
For example, in 1942 the rule was revised to make it
clear that, in determining whether "certifying accountants" are
independent as to a particular registrant, there should be taken
into account not only the work done in auditing the financial
statements but also other work done for the registrant. 102/
In
1958 the Commission amended the rule to recognize that in some
instances, such as relationships between the auditor or his or her
family and "remote affiliates” of the registrant, "some latitude
for judgement
is necessary” in evaluating the accountant's
independence.
The rule, therefore, was revised "to permit a test
of materiality to these borderline areas."103/ Finally, the rule

9 9 / (...continued)
be considered independent with respect to any person in
whom he has any interest, directly or indirectly, or with
whom he is connected as an officer, agent, employee,
promoter, underwriter, trustee, partner, director, or
person performing similar function.
Federal Trade Commission, Rules and Regulations Under t he
Securities Act of 1 9 3 3 . Article 14, "Accountants" (July 6,
1933).
100/ 17 CFR §210.2-01. See, Accounting Series Release No.
12 (February 21, 1940).
101/Id.
102/ ASR 37

(November 7, 1942).

103/ ASR 79

(April 8, 1958).

("ASR")
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was amended in 1972, and again in 1983, to clarify which "members"
of the accounting firm must meet the independence criteria. 104/
Current Rule 2-01 states as follows:
(a) The Commission will not recognize any person as a
certified public accountant who is not duly registered and in
good standing as such under the laws of the place of his
residence or principal office.
The Commission will not
recognize any person as a public accountant who is not in good
standing and entitled to practice as such under the laws of
the place of his residence or principal office.
(b) The Commission will not recognize any certified public
accountant or public accountant as independent who is not in
fact independent.
For example,
an accountant will be
considered not independent with respect to any person or any
of its parents, its subsidiaries, or other affiliates (1) in
which, during the period of his professional engagement to
examine the financial statements being reported on or at the
date of his report, he, his firm, or a member of his firm had,
or was committed to acquire, any direct financial interest or
any material indirect financial interest; (2) with which,
during the period of his professional engagement to examine
the financial statements being reported on, at the date of his
report or during the period covered by the financial
statements, he, his firm, or a member of his firm was
connected
as
a promoter,
underwriter,
voting
trustee,
director, officer, or employee.
A firm's independence will
not be deemed to be affected adversely where a former officer
or employee of a particular person is employed by or becomes
a partner, shareholder or other principal in the firm and such
individual has completely disassociated himself from the
person and its affiliates and does not participate in auditing
financial statements of the person or its affiliates covering
any period of his employment by the person. For the purposes
of §2.10.2-01(b), the term "member" means (i) all partners,
shareholders, and other principals in the firm,
(ii) any
professional employee involved in providing any professional
service to the person, its parents, subsidiaries, or other
affiliates,
and
(iii)
any professional employee having
managerial responsibilities and located in the engagement
office or other office of the firm which participates in a
significant portion of the audit.
(c)
In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not
independent
with
respect
to a particular person,
the
Commission will give appropriate consideration to all relevant
104/ ASR 125 (June 23, 1972) and Financial Reporting Release No.
("FRR") 10 (February 25, 1983).
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circumstances, including evidence bearing on all relationships
between the accountant and that person or any affiliate
thereof, and will not confine itself to the relationships
existing in connection with the filing of reports with the
Commission.
Interpretations
Rule 2*01 does not
contain comprehensive guidance for
determining whether accountants are independent because, as stated
in subparagraph (c) of the rule, such a determination must be made
in view of all the circumstances of a particular case.
Since its
inception, the Commission and its staff have been called upon to
make such determinations and periodically the Commission has
published its opinions to apprise the public of its views.105/
In 1982, the Commission conducted a complete review of its
accounting and auditing releases,
including those concerning
auditor independence issues.
This review led to the publication
by the Commission of the "Codification of Financial Reporting
Policies" ("CFRP" or the "Codification").106/
The Codification
provided
in one
document,
organized
in a
logical manner,
information officially published by the Commission since 1934 that
continued to be relevant to preparers, users, and auditors of
registrants' financial statements. Section 600 of the Codification
is entitled "Matters Relating to Independent Accountants" and
contains statements by the Commission related to the role of
independence in the auditing process, Commission requirements and
interpretations
relating
to
independence,
disclosures
about
independent accountants, the relation of the performance of non*
audit services to auditor independence, accountants' liability for
reports on unaudited interim financial information under the 1933
Act, and certain certification requirements. Since 1982, whenever
the Commission has
issued a release addressing an auditor
independence issue, section 600 of the Codification has been
amended to include,
in the appropriate subsection,
relevant

1 05/ See, e.g., ASRs 2 (1937), 22 (1941), 37 (1942), 47 (1944), 81
(1958), 112 (1968), 126 (1972), 234 (1977), and 291 (1981).
See part I of this study for a description of the Commission's
opinions.
106/ FRR 1 (April 15, 1982). This release also announced that the
Commission would no longer publish ASRs.
Instead,
the
Commission would publish one series of releases regarding
accounting and auditing enforcement cases, called "Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases" or "AAERs," and another
series containing other information regarding accounting and
auditing matters related to financial reporting issues,
entitled "Financial Reporting Releases" or "FRRs."
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excerpts from the release.107/
Today, Codification section 600
provides extensive interpretations, guidelines, and examples for
registrants and auditors to use in evaluating independence issues.
In addition, the Commission staff responds to numerous oral
and written requests for informal advice on the application of the
Commission's independence requirements.108/
During fiscal year
1993, the staff issued eleven interpretive letters following full
consideration of the requestors' written submissions and, in many
instances, meetings with the requestors and their representatives.
The staff also responded to over one hundred phone calls regarding
independence issues. Written responses to requests for such advice
are placed in a file that is available in the Commission's public
reference room.109/ Many of these letters also are reproduced by
private publishers of financial information.
Recent issues addressed b y the staff include whether an
accounting firm's independence is impaired when (1) an independent
auditor of an Argentinean company acts as that company's statutory
auditor,110/ (2) the Chief Financial Officer of an audit client in
New York City is the brother of a partner in the accounting firm's
Boston office, or (3) an accounting firm acquires a French law firm
that provides legal representation to the accounting firm's audit
clients.

107/ For example, when the Commission in 1988 and 1989 expanded
and accelerated the disclosure requirements regarding changes
in registrants' independent accountants, relevant portions of
the adopting releases were inserted at sections 603.02.d and
603.06-08.a. of the Codification.
These requirements are
discussed in part I of this study.
108/ Unless republished in a Commission release, staff responses
do not bind the Commission.
The staff responses usually are
in the form of a representation that the staff of the Office
of the Chief Accountant either considers the auditor's
independence to be impaired or will not raise a question
regarding the auditor's independence based on the facts,
circumstances, and representations made to the staff in that
particular case. If the person requesting the staff's advice
disagrees with the staff's position, that person m ay ask the
staff to seek an informal statement of the Commission's views.
Granting the request for such a statement, however,
is
entirely within the Commission's discretion. 17 CFR 202.1(d).
109/ See FRR 33

(November 25, 1988) and FRR 4 (October 14, 1982).

110/ Letter from John M. Riley, Deputy Chief Accountant, to Mr.
Richard Dieter (April 8, 1993) (indicating that independence
would be deemed to be impaired).
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Further information regarding the Commission's disclosure,
interpretive,
and
enforcement
efforts
to
enhance
auditors'
independence is set forth in part II of this study.
Disclosure
requirements
discussed
in
that
section
include
information
regarding audit committees of boards of directors, and changes of
independent auditors.
Interpretive releases set forth decisions
made by the Commission and the staff in specific situations, and
expand
upon
the
Commission's
requirement
for
"scrupulous
adherence "111/ to the fact and appearance of auditor independence.
Finally, enforcement cases discussed in part II display the
Commission's willingness to take appropriate action when auditors
fail to fulfill the independence requirements.
In
addition,
particular
aspects
of
the
Commission's
independence rule and interpretations are discussed in detail in
Appendix II to this study, which contains a comparison of SEC,
AICPA, and other nations' independence requirements.
IV.

PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") 112/ promotes the concept of auditor independence.
The
AICPA's auditing standards, adopted by its Auditing Standards Board
("ASB "),113/ and the A I C P A Code of Professional Conduct (the
"Code"), as interpreted b y the AICPA's Ethics Division, firmly
establish auditor independence as one of the organization's
fundamental principles.
The accounting profession, however, was relatively slow to
establish
specific
requirements
that
define
independent
conduct.114/
For example, although a resolution to prohibit
auditors from acting as officers or directors of audit clients was

111/ ASR 296

(August 20, 1981).

112/ The AICPA is the largest national professional institute of
Certified Public Accountants
("CPAs”) with over 310,000
members in public practice, industry, and academia.
113/ A resolution of the AICPA Council designates the ASB as the
body empowered to promulgate auditing and attest standards
and procedures.
See Rule 202 of the Code of Professional
Conduct, ET §202.01, and Appendix A to the Code.
The ASB's
15 members are partners in large, medium, and small accounting
firms and an academic.
Each serves on the ASB on a part-time
basis.
The eight ASB staff are employees of the AICPA, and
funding for the ASB is provided by the AICPA.
114/ See part II of this study for the historical development of
United States independence standards.
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first introduced at an annual meeting of the American Institute of
Accountants (the predecessor to the AICPA) in 1931 115/ a final
rule prohibiting such relationships was not adopted by the AICPA
until 1961, 1 1 6 / well after the enactment of the Federal securities
laws and the Commission's imposition of such a requirement in Rule
2-01 of Regulation S-X. In addition, the profession's adoption in
1941 of a rule prohibiting auditors from owning securities issued
by their publicly held audit clients simply echoed the Commission's
Rule 2-01.117/ And it was not until 1947 (14 years after enactment
of the independence requirement in the Federal securities laws)
that the Executive Committee of the AICPA issued a "tentative
statement” on accountants' independence, which was intended to
provide guidance to the profession, the public, and others.118/
This statement read, in part:
A most
important
function which
the
certified public
accountant performs in our economic life today is the part he
plays in the maintenance of mutual confidence which is
necessary in business relationships and transactions.
The
relationship may be that between management and stockholders,
especially in publicly-held corporations....
It has become
of great value to those who rely on financial statements of
business enterprises that they be reviewed b y persons skilled
in accounting whose judgment is uncolored b y any interest in
the enterprise, and upon whom the obligation has been imposed
to disclose material facts.
With the growth of business
enterprises, the public accountant makes a vital contribution
in meeting the need for independent, impartial, and expert
opinions
on
the
financial
position
and
results
of
operations.119/
Today, the AICPA maintains its independence requirements apart
from those of the Commission.
In many areas, the Commission,
rather than adopting a position similar to an AICPA requirement,
simply refers registrants and their auditors to the AICPA
requirement as an appropriate interpretation of the Commission's
auditor independence rules.
In other areas, the Commission's
interpretive guidance is more expansive or more explicit than the
AICPA's requirements, resulting in certain inconsistencies between
115 / L. Rappaport, SEC Accounting Practice and Procedure.
26.3 (The Ronald Press Company, 3d ed. 1972).

26.2-

116/ D. Causey, Duties and Liabilities of Public Accountants, 26
(Dow Jones-Irwin, rev. ed. 1982).
117/ Id.
118/ Rappaport,

supra, at 26.6-26.7.

119 / Id. quoting 84 The Journal of Accountancy 51

(1947).
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the two sets of regulations.
These differences may be, in part,
because the Commission's views are more relevant to larger issuers
who are seeking capital in the public markets, while the AICPA's
rules apply to auditors of the financial statements of smaller,
private companies as well as those of public companies.
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
As noted above, generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS") 120/
require that auditors be independent.
General Standard No. 2
states, "In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence
in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or
auditors. " 1 2 1 /
Interpretations of GAAS, issued as Statements on
Auditing Standards b y the ASB, further emphasize the importance of
the concept of auditor independence.
Statement on Auditing
Standards No. ("SAS”) 1, states:
It is of utmost importance to the profession that the general
public maintain confidence in the independence of independent
auditors.
Public confidence would be impaired by evidence
that independence was actually lacking, and it might also be
impaired by the existence of circumstances which reasonable
people might believe likely to influence independence. To be
independent, the auditor must be intellectually honest; to be
recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation
or interest in the client, its management, or its owners---

120/ In February 1941,
the Commission amended Rule 2-02 of
Regulation S-X, 17 CFR §210.2-02, to require that the auditor
state in his or her report "whether the audit was made in
accordance
with
generally
accepted
auditing
standards
applicable in the circumstances.” Accounting Series Release
No. ("ASR") 21 (February 5, 1941).
In this release, the
Commission defined "generally accepted auditing standards" to
mean the application of "generally recognized normal auditing
procedures" with professional competence by properly trained
persons. The Commission defined "generally recognized normal
auditing procedures" to be those normally employed by skilled
accountants and those prescribed by authoritative bodies
dealing with the subject of auditing, such as the various
accounting
societies
and
governmental
bodies
having
jurisdiction in the area. Id. Following this addition to the
Commission's rules, the relevant professional committee at the
time, the Committee on Auditing Procedure, began a study to
determine which auditing standards should be included within
"GAAS."
In 1948, the membership of the AICPA's predecessor
organization approved ten standards as constituting GAAS,
including three general standards, three standards of field
work, and four standards of reporting.
See AU §150.02.
121/ AU §150.02.

43
Independent auditors should not only be independent in fact;
they should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt
their independence [italics in original].122/
Code of Professional Conduct
In practice, however, the regulations and interpretations
promulgated pursuant to the Code,
rather than the auditing
standards, embody the AICPA's specific independence requirements
and regulations.
These regulations unconditionally support the
concept of auditor independence by stating, in part:
The public expects a number of character traits in a certified
public accountant but primarily integrity and objectivity and,
in the practice of public accounting, independence.
Independence has always been a concept fundamental to the
accounting profession, the cornerstone of its philosophical
structure. For no matter how competent any [Certified Public
Accountant] may be, his opinion on financial statements will
be of little value to those who rely on him - whether they be
clients or any of his unseen audience of credit grantors,
investors, governmental agencies and the like - unless he
maintains his independence....
To sum up, CPAs cannot avoid external pressures on their
integrity and objectivity in the course of their professional
work, but they are expected to resist these pressures.
They
must, in fact, retain their integrity and objectivity in all
phases of their practice and, when expressing opinions on
financial statements, avoid involvement in situations that
would impair the credibility of their independence in the
minds of reasonable men familiar with the facts. 123/
The Bylaws of the AICPA require members to conform with the
Code and provide that members may be disciplined for violations of
the Code.124/ The AICPA's Professional Ethics Executive Committee
provides interpretations of the independence requirements in the
Code, and occasionally issues ethics rulings.
Accordingly, the
Ethics Committee, rather than the ASB, is the generally recognized
authority within the AICPA in the area of auditor independence.
In addition, individual accounting firms are required by the
AICPA to have internal procedures that monitor compliance with
independence standards and rules.
The AICPA's Statements on
122/ AU §220.03.
123/ ET §§ 52.01 and 52.19.
124/ AICPA Bylaws,

§§ 2.3.2 and 7.4.1, respectively.
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Quality Control Standards provide general guidance that the firms
use in developing specific policies and procedures.
Many firms
have their partners annually sign statements attesting to the
absence of any situations that may impair the firm's independence.
Firms also may distribute new client lists, instructing members of
the firm to divest any disqualifying interest in those entities,
and provide various levels of independence training.125/
Relationship of SBC and A ICPA Requirements
The Securities and Exchange Commission exercises essentially
no oversight of the AICPA's Ethics Division.
Although the AICPA
ethics staff and the Commission staff routinely discuss individual
independence situations on an informal basis. 126/ historically, the
Ethics Division consistently has not sought Commission input into
the development of its independence interpretations and rulings
and, on the occasions when the Commission staff has expressed an
opinion different from that of the Ethics Division on an issue,
the AICPA generally has not been receptive to the staff's views.
Further, as the AICPA's disciplinary proceedings are closed from
public view, the Commission staff has not been able to form an
opinion as to the efficacy of the profession's enforcement of its
independence requirements.
In a similar respect, the Commission
and its staff have been comfortable assessing the facts from the
viewpoint of a "reasonable investor" and making their own auditor
independence determinations without formal consultation with the
profession. This has led to two sets of independence requirements
that auditors to public companies must follow.127/
The existence of multiple requirements sometimes leads to
difficulties, particularly in cases when an entity's financial
statements are required for the first time to be included in a
filing with the Commission.
For example, when a private company
determines to make a public offering of its securities (or when the

125/ See, R. Kay and D. Searfoss, Handbook of Accounting and
A uditing. 5-18 (Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 2d ed. 1989).
126/ As noted above, in areas where the AICPA has established an
independence requirement, and the Commission has not, the
Commission may
look
to the AICPA requirement
as
the
appropriate guidance.
127/ Not all auditors to Commission registrants, however, are
members of the AICPA.
Although the auditors to the vast
majority of Commission registrants are firms whose partners
are members of the AICPA, AICPA membership is not mandatory
for an accountant to practice before the Commission.
The
financial statements of an estimated 500 public companies
filing with the Commission are audited by an estimated 300
firms whose partners are not members of the AICPA.
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company is acquired by a public company), the company may discover
that the report of its auditor is unacceptable because the auditor
did not meet Commission independence requirements at the time of
the audit, even though the auditor was in compliance with the AICPA
requirements. In such cases, it may be necessary to engage another
accountant to audit and report on the company's
financial
statements, or, in rare cases where another accountant is unable
to perform the audit, the company may be unable to complete an
offering. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, while many
of the larger firms have charged specific partners with the
continuous duty to be aware of both Commission and AICPA
independence requirements and to assure compliance with those
requirements, it frequently is difficult for smaller firms to stay
current as to the AICPA and SEC requirements and the differences
between the two.
The Commission staff recognizes the merits of minimizing, to
the extent possible, the differences between the two sets of
requirements.
The staff and representatives of the Ethics
Committee recently met on a trial basis to discuss differences
between the Commission's and the AICPA's independence rules and
interpretations.
While no decisions were reached, the staff and
the division representatives have decided to continue such
meetings.
Many of the differences between the SEC and AICPA requirements
may not be resolved easily. For example, the AICPA, in recognition
of the lack of adequate accounting personnel in many small,
privately held companies, permits auditors to perform certain
bookkeeping tasks without negatively affecting the auditors'
independence.
The Commission, however, has taken the view that
this practice results in auditors auditing their own work,
destroying the possibility of a critical outside look at companies'
financial statements, and impairs auditors' independence.
This
issue and further differences between the Commission's and the
AICPA's independence requirements are explained in detail in
Appendix II to this study.
V.

OTHER NATIONS'

INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS

Domestic
registrants
increasingly
conduct
international
businesses with operations in countries that are serviced by local
offices, or affiliates, of their independent accountants.
In
addition, a record number of foreign registrants have become
subject to the Commission's registration requirements.1 2 8 /
The
128/ In 1992, more than $34.6 billion of securities of foreign
issuers were filed for registration under the Securities Act
of 1933. These issuers included 87 new foreign companies from
21 countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Australia,
(continued...)
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Commission generally has required auditors of the financial
statements of domestic registrants with non-U.S. operations, and
auditors of the financial statements of non-U.S. registrants, to
comply with the U.S. auditing and independence requirements when
their audit reports are to be included in Commission filings.
The first time an audit report of a non-U.S. auditor is to be
filed with the Commission, the staff may ask the auditor for
information
regarding
that
auditor's
familiarity with U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), U.S. generally
accepted auditing standards
("GAAS"), and U.S.
independence
requirements.
If the auditor is not sufficiently knowledgeable
about U.S. standards and requirements, the staff may suggest that
the registrant or the auditor engage an affiliate of a U.S.
accounting firm either as a consultant to the non-U.S. auditor or
to assist directly in the audit.129/
The Commission's
insistence on a U.S.
GAAS audit and
compliance with U.S. independence requirements is based on the view
that U.S. investors are entitled t o the same level of assurance
from an audit, irrespective of where it is performed.
One of the
more controversial issues facing the Commission today is the extent
that the Commission, when making independence determinations,
should take into account the customs, laws, and culture of the
nation in which the audit is conducted. The Commission's staff has
been reluctant to acquiesce to arguments based on representations
that "this is how it is done in the registrant's home country,"
because the staff has looked at auditor independence issues from
the point of view of the reasonable investor in the United States
who will be asked to invest his, her, or its funds in the

1 2 8 / (...continued)
Brazil, Korea, and Singapore. At the end of 1992, there were
496 foreign companies from 35 countries filing reports with
the Commission.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Fifty-Eighth Annual Report to Congress. 52 (1992).
129/ The staff may send a letter to the registrant or the
accounting firm asking for information demonstrating the
firm's
independence
requirements
for
its
professional
employees,
that
the
firm
is
in
good
standing
and
professionally qualified in the jurisdiction in which the
report is issued, and that the firm's professional members
and staff are knowledgeable regarding and have followed in
this engagement U.S. GAAP, U.S. GAAS, and U.S. independence
requirements.
When a consultant is engaged, the consultant
may be asked to provide the staff with a letter describing,
among other things, the foreign auditor's compliance with the
independence and reporting requirements in Article 2 of
Regulation S-X, 17 CFR §210.2-01 et seq.
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registrant's securities.130/
This
"reasonable investor"
is
entitled under the Federal securities laws to the assurance
provided by an independent audit.131/ In countries where the level
of assurance provided by an audit falls below that contemplated
under U.S. law, the requirement for independently audited financial
statements may be deemed to have not been met, regardless of
disclosure of the differing requirements. In addition, comparable
audits and independence requirements contribute to an "even playing
field" in the competition for U.S. investors' funds.132/
The Commission, however, has been involved in and supports
efforts to harmonize international accounting, auditing,
and
independence
requirements.133/
The
Commission
staff
is
participating in the efforts of the International Federation of
Accountants ("IFAC") 134/ and the International Organization of

130/ This staff study on auditor independence issues should not be
read as expressing any position of the Commission or the staff
on the issue of foreign listing requirements on U.S.
exchanges. This study speaks only to balancing the protection
of U.S. investors afforded by the U.S. auditor independence
requirements against
the possible denial of investment
opportunities in securities issued by foreign entities whose
auditors fail to satisfy those requirements.
131/ See part II of this study regarding "The Need for Auditor
Independence" and "Background" of the development of the
independence requirement in this country.
As noted in that
section,
the U.S.
Supreme
Court
has
stated
that
the
independence requirement is "to obviate the fear of loss from
reliance on inaccurate information" and, accordingly, it is
"not enough that financial statements be accurate; the public
must also perceive them as being accurate." United States v.
Arthur Young & C o . , 465 U.S. 805, 819 n. 15.
132/ Limited exceptions to the U.S. independence requirements have
been provided in interpretations issued by the Commission
where foreign law requires that an auditor have a financial
interest in its audit client, and for certain de minimis or
immaterial
services
provided
to
foreign
divisions,
subsidiaries, or investees of domestic registrants provided
such services are consistent with the local professional
ethics rules.
See Appendix II to this study.
133/ See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Policy
Statement, Regulation of International Securities-Markets. 810, International Series Release No. 1 (November 1988).
134/ IFAC is an organization of over 100 accounting professional
organizations representing 78 countries.
IFAC has the broad
(continued...)
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Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") 135/ to resolve differences in
these standards.
In 1992, at its XVIIth Annual Conference in
London, IOSCO adopted a resolution recommending that its member
nations accept unified auditing standards developed by the
International Auditing Practices Committee, an IFAC technical
committee. This resolution, however, notes that, at present, there
is no consensus on issues regarding auditor qualifications and
independence, among others, and that these areas therefore are not
included within the recommendation. IFAC is continuing to work on
these issues.
Independent
of
IOSCO,
the
Commission
has
adopted
a
multijurisdictional disclosure system ("MJDS") with Canada.136/
Prior to the implementation of this system, the Commission studied
in considerable detail the Canadian independence requirements. The
Commission ultimately concluded that the Canadian requirements were
sufficiently close to the U.S. independence requirements that U.S.
investors could rely, to some extent, on the Canadian standards.
As a result, under the MJDS, in order to make an initial public
offering in the United States, Canadian auditors to Canadian
registrants need to comply with the U.S. independence requirements
only with respect to the audit of the financial statements of the
most recent fiscal year prior to the offering. 137/
Once a U.S.
offering is made, however, the auditor must continue to comply with
the U.S. independence requirements.138/

1 3 4 / (...continued)
objective to develop and enhance a coordinated
accountancy profession with harmonized standards.

worldwide

135/ IOSCO is an organization of over 50 national securities
commissions resolved to ensure better regulation of markets,
to exchange information,
to promote the development of
domestic markets, to unite in an effective surveillance of
international securities transactions, and to ensure effective
enforcement against securities law offenses.
136/ Securities Act Release No. 6902

(June 21, 1991).

137/ As a general rule, all three years of a registrant's financial
statements included in a Commission filing must be audited by
an accountant who is in compliance with U.S. independence
requirements.
See Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation S-X, 17 CFR
§§210.2-01 and 210.3-01 et seq.
138/ See, e.g., General Instruction III. B. to Form F-10,
§239.40, which states:

17 CFR

The Commission's rules on auditor independence,
as
codified in Section 600 of the Codification of Financial
(continued...)
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The OCA, with the assistance of foreign regulators and
accounting firms with offices or affiliates outside the United
States,
has reviewed the independence requirements in other
jurisdictions.
The staff's review was intended to identify
specific differences between nations' requirements and procedures
by which the requirements are established and enforced.
This
review has indicated that the U.S. independence requirements, as
implemented by the Commission and the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants. 139/ tend to be more specific and more
restrictive than those of other nations.
Reasons for this
different level of standards may include that independent audits
in some nations are conducted by statutory auditors, who are
directly responsible to shareholders, and that, in certain other

138/ (...continued)
Reporting Policies, apply to auditor reports on all
financial
statements
that
are
included
in
this
registration statement, except that such rules do not
apply with respect to periods prior to the most recent
fiscal year for which financial statements are included
in the registration statement .... Notwithstanding the
exception in the previous sentence, such rules do apply
with respect to any periods prior to the most recent
fiscal year if the issuer previously was required to file
with the Commission a report or registration statement
containing an auditor report on financial statements for
such periods as to which the Commission's rules on
auditor independence applied.
The Commission staff has been willing to work with Canadian
auditors
to address
difficulties
in meeting
the MUDS
independence requirement in limited areas. For example, when
Canadian auditors of "Schedule I ” Canadian banks, which may
wish to make offerings in the U.S. under the M JD S , indicated
that they would not be able to comply with the time table for
phasing-in revised U.S. independence requirements regarding
auditors' loans from financial institution audit clients, the
staff indicated that it would not object to a limited
extension of the compliance deadline.
Letter to Messrs.
Robert D. Brown, Alan J. Dilworth, and W. Ross Walker from Mr.
Walter P. Schuetze, Chief Accountant (May 19, 1993).
139/ For a discussion of the auditor independence requirements of
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, see
part IV and Appendix II of this study.
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nations, the audit ma y be conducted primarily for a purpose other
than financial reporting.140/
Many of the specific differences among nations' independence
requirements are discussed in detail in Appendix II to this study.
VI.

RECENT AND CURRENTLY PROPOSED CHANGES

In a manner similar to the SEC staff's continuous r e 
examination of its independence rules and interpretations, the
accounting profession reviews its independence requirements.
For
example, in 1991 the AICPA noted that its Interpretation 101-1,
which generally prohibited auditors from having any material,
unsecured loan to or from an audit client, needed to be restated
in view of alleged abuses of the permissible exceptions stated in
the rule.
This rule prohibited auditors from having any loan to
or
from an
audit
client
except
for loans
from
financial
institutions that were made under normal lending procedures, terms,
and requirements and were (1) not material to the borrower's net
worth, (2) home mortgages, or (3) other secured loans.
The AICPA
amended its rule so that the only loans that an auditor may obtain
from financial institutions that are audit clients are
(1)
automobile loans and leases collateralized by the vehicle, (2)
credit card and checking account advances with an aggregate unpaid
balance of $5,000 or less, (3) loans on the cash surrender value
of insurance policies, and (4) loans fully collateralized by cash
deposits (passbook l oan s ) . Loans complying with the prior rule,
however, were "grandfathered" under the new rule.
Others also stand watch on the quality of independence
requirements.
For example, the POB recently issued a special
report
containing,
among
other
things,
"Recommendations
to
Strengthen
Independence
and
Professionalism."141/
The
POB
suggests, among other things, 1) that the AICPA "sharpen further
the distinction between client advocacy and client service and
incorporate
that distinction into the profession's Code of
Professional Conduct," 2) that "accounting firms take special care
to ensure their participation in the standards setting process is
characterized by objectivity and professionalism" rather than
acting as "hired g u n s ” for their audit clients, and 3) that, to
prevent audit engagement partners from supporting a client's policy
on an accounting matter in discussions with the SEC staff when
"that policy is clearly an unreasonable application of generally

140/ For example, it is the staff's understanding that in Germany
and Japan an entity's financial statements form the basis for
annual tax accounts.
141/ POB, In the Public Interest; A Special Report by the Public
Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section, A I C P A , 43 (March
5, 1993).
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accepted accounting principles," an engagement partner should
consult on accounting issues with partners at the appropriate level
in that partner's firm before engaging in discussions with the SEC
staff.142/
In addition, the AICPA Board of Directors, in its June 1993
paper entitled Meeting the Financial Reporting Needs of the Future:
A P u b l i c Commitment _From the Public Accounting Profession, noted
steps "to improve the value of financial information and the
public's confidence in it," 143/ including enhanced measures
"Assuring Auditor Independence. "144/ The AICPA Board of Directors
recommendations.include (1) the adoption of rules by the SEC and
other regulators that would "prohibit public companies and other
organizations with public accountability from hiring the partner
responsible for their audit for one year after the partner ceases
to serve that client,” and (2) the use of mandatory audit
committees, composed entirely of independent directors whenever
practical,
that are charged with specific responsibilities,
including overseeing the company's financial reporting process and
recommending
the
appointment
of ,the
company's
independent
accountants.145/
The Commission, as explained in part II of this report,
historically has encouraged the use of independent audit committees
and the national exchanges, under the Commission's oversight, have
adopted various audit committee requirements.
The recommendation regarding the one-year ban on a company
hiring the engagement partner that has been responsible for the
audit of the company's financial statements, however, poses several
difficult legal and policy concerns.
As suggested by this
recommendation, there are reported cases where significant frauds
have been discovered in companies that have hired former engagement
partners to be chief financial officers or chief accounting
officers, or for similar positions. The implication is that audit
engagement partners may be hesitant to challenge managements'
positions on accounting and reporting matters if the partners
anticipate the opportunity to be hired by management.
It would be difficult,
Commission administratively

if not impossible, however, for the
to prohibit a company from hiring

142/ Id. at 43-46.
142/ AICPA Board of Directors, Meeting the Financial Reporting
Needs of the Future: A Public Commitment From the Public
Accounting Profession. 1 (June 1993).
144/ Id. at 4.
145/ Id.
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anyone, including the individual that the company believes is the
most qualified candidate for any position within the company.146/
Further, it would appear that the time for the greatest risk to
investors is while a compliant or conspirator engagement partner
remains with the accounting firm and in control of the audit of the
company's financial statements.
Once the partner leaves the
engagement and joins the company, a new engagement partner, with
a fresh vi e w of the company, may be more willing to challenge
corporate management.
In other words, if management and the
engagement partner have the intent to perpetuate a fraud, the
partner may remain with the firm rather than risk turning the audit
engagement
over to another individual who may uncover the
conspiracy.
In addition, if management wants to compensate the
engagement partner for his or her role in a fraud, a ban on hiring
the engagement partner for a certain period of time may not
prohibit the company from providing payments to the partner, after
he or she resigns from the accounting firm, through consulting
contracts or other means.
The heaviest burden of such a prohibition on hiring former
engagement partners may fall on small corporations that are in need
of inside accounting expertise provided by someone familiar with
their business and industry.
Due to these complex issues, it may
be advisable for the AICPA, who has advocated such a restriction,
to consider the adoption of an ethics rule in this area before the
Commission takes action. The AICPA may be in a better position to
analyze the detriments to smaller businesses and smaller accounting
firms of such a ban on employment opportunities.
The Commission
will continue to pursue enforcement action whenever it uncovers
fraudulent financial reporting that has been facilitated by a
"revolving door," and the staff will monitor the AICPA's efforts
in pursuing an ethics rule in this area.
Another argument that sometimes is advanced is that the
Commission should adopt a rule mandating periodic rotation of
accounting firms conducting the audits of the financial statements
of public companies.
The theory behind that argument is that the
146/ As a result of these difficulties, the implementation of such
a restriction more likely would be in the form of a Commission
or staff interpretation that if a corporation hires the former
partner in charge of the engagement to audit the corporation's
financial statements, then the partner's former firm would not
be considered independent for a number of years from the date
the corporation hired the former partner (or, possibly, from
the date the partner resigned from his or her former firm).
If the Commission or staff issued such an interpretation, the
m a j o r firms might attempt to amend their partnership or other
agreements to have each individual, when he or she becomes a
partner in the firm, agree not to accept a subsequent position
that will impair the firm's independence.
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auditors will not have the opportunity to develop the long-term,
close relationships that could cause an auditor's independence to
become impaired and that auditors would be more likely to force
clients to make more disclosures and adopt more conservative
accounting policies or practices.
The SECPS currently has
requirements establishing a maximum term over which an individual
partner may serve a particular audit client, in order to address
that possibility.
That term currently is seven years.
There is
no current requirement, however, for a periodic rotation of
independent accounting firms.
Mandatory rotation of independent accounting firms has been
examined before.
The Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities'
(known
as
the
Cohen
Commission)
Report.
Conclusions,
and
Recommendations. issued in 1978, expressed several concerns about
such a policy.147/ The Cohen Commission indicated that mandatory
rotation of firms could increase considerably the cost of audits
as there would be frequent duplication of audit start-up costs and
learning time to become familiar with a company.
Further, the
Cohen Commission's study of cases of substandard audits found that
there may be a "higher peril" associated with new audit clients;
it stated that once an auditor becomes "well acquainted with the
operations of the client, audit risks are reduced."148/ The Cohen
Commission also indicated that mandatory rotation of independent
accounting firms could lead to further issues caused by "excessive
competition” among accounting firms.149/
The conclusion reached
by the Cohen Commission was,
Since
the
cost
of mandatory rotation
[of independent
accounting firms]
would be high and the benefits that
financial statement users might gain would be offset by the
loss of benefits that result from a continuing relationship,
rotation should not be required.150/

147/ The
Commission
on
Auditors'
Responsibilities,
Report.
Conclusions, and Recommendations, 108-109 (AICPA 1978).
148/ Id. at 109.
149/ "Excessive competition,” as discussed b y the Cohen Commission,
could occur due to the similarity of the "products” provided
by the firms and the difficulty of investors' evaluating
differences in the quality of audits among the firms, among
other things.
These factors contribute to competition based
principally on the price of the audit, which, in turn, may
lead to limited budgets for conducting audits.
The Cohen
Commission indicated that these limited budgets may lead to
time pressures that set the stage for faulty audit work. Id.
at 101-118.
150/ Id. at 109.
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The Cohen Commission further indicated that a company's audit
committee is in the best position to decide when it is appropriate
to change auditors.151/
The Commission staff is aware of only one country, Italy, in
which rotation of accounting firms is required.
Th e Italian
securities regulator, CONSOB, also has the authority to approve the
selection of a company's auditors and to establish the audit fee.
That additional authority might mitigate the fear that further
increased competition for audits, which often are won by cutting
fees, would cause a reduction in audit procedures and audit
quality.
In addition to the Italian situation, the staff is aware
that, prior to 1992, Tier I Canadian banks' financial statements
were required to rotate accounting firms every two years under the
Canadian Bank Act. The Bank Act was amended in 1992 to delete that
requirement along with the requirement that Tier I Canadian banks'
financial statements be audited jointly b y teams of two auditors.
The OC A currently is of the view that the SECPS requirement
for a periodic change in the engagement partner in charge of the
audit, especially when coupled with the SECPS requirement for
second partner reviews. 152/ provides a sufficient opportunity for
bringing a fresh viewpoint to the audit without creating the
significant costs and risks associated with changing accounting
firms that were identified by the Cohen Commission.
The OCA
recognizes that a well-informed, independent audit committee may
be in the best position to decide when the benefits of a change in
auditors outweighs the costs. Several hundred companies make this
determination each year and change auditors. 153/ Accordingly, the
staff does not, at this time, recommend legislation or rulemaking
to mandate rotation of independent accounting firms.

151/ Id.
152/ A "concurring partner" or "second partner" review is a review
of the audit workpapers and related information b y a partner
(or other SECPS approved reviewer) other than the partner in
charge of the audit.
Among other things, the second partner
objectively should review accounting, auditing, and financial
reporting issues from the perspective of someone who has not
dealt with the client on an ongoing basis and is less
susceptible to pressure from the client. For many firms, the
second partner's approval is a prerequisite to the issuance
of the audit report.
153/ For a discussion of the disclosures required upon a change in
independent accounting firms, see Auditor Resignation or
Dismissal in part II of this report.
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VIZ. CONCLUSION
The OCA believes that the combination of the extensive systems
of independence requirements issued by the Commission and the
AICPA, coupled with the Commission's active enforcement program,
provide to investors reasonable safeguards against loss due to the
conduct of audits by accountants that lack independence from their
audit clients.
The enactment of detailed legislation or the
promulgation of additional rules is not necessary.
The OCA believes that further legislation or fundamental
changes in the Commission's regulations are not necessary at this
time for the protection of investors.
-END-
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Committee on Energy and Commerce
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE

W ashington, D C 20515-6119

March 18, 1993

The Honorable Richard C. Breeden
Chairman
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20549
Dear Chairman Breeden:
On February 18, 1993, you testified before the Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance in support of H.R. 574, the
"Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act.” In that
testimony, you referred to an ongoing case, SEC v. Ernst & Young,
in which the Commission is seeking a permanent injunction against
Ernst & Young (as successor to Arthur Young & Co.) for certain
securities violations resulting from Arthur Young's lack of
independence as outside accountant for RepublicBank Corporation.
This morning, the Subcommittee reported H.R. 574 to the full
Energy and Commerce Committee.
This bill represents an important
step in making the auditing industry more truly accountable to the
investing public.
It is important that this new level of
statutory accountability not be undercut by a lack of real-world
independence.
I understand that the Commission's existing rules regarding
independence address a situation like that which arose in the
Arthur Young context, where more than fifty Arthur Young partners
were members of real estate partnerships that borrowed over $15.8
million from the audit client, RepublicBank, and where at least
twenty-seven Arthur Young partners received more than $5 million
in personal loans from that institution.
However, this case and
others highlight the importance of protecting the independence of
auditors from their auditing clients.
Despite changes that appear
to have occurred in both the auditing industry and in the
preparation and use of audited financial statements, the
Commission has not formally reviewed its independence rules for
some time.
Accordingly I request that the Commission prepare a
study of the need for, and any impediments to, the independence of
public accountants in the preparation and certification of
financial statements for purposes of the Federal securities laws.

The Honorable Richard C. Breeden
Page 2
March 18, 1993

The Commission should provide the members of the Subcommittee
with this study, accompanied by any recommendations for
legislation the Commission considers appropriate or any
conclusions as to rule changes that may be required for the
protection of investors or the public interest, as soon as
possible, but not later than one year from this date.
If the
members of the Commission or the Commission staff have any
questions about this request, they should contact Elise Hoffmann
of the Subcommittee staff at (202) 226-2424.
Thank you for your
attention to this matter.
Sincerely

Edward J. Markey
Chairman

cc:

The Honorable Jack Fields, Ranking Republican Member
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
Members, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance
The Honorable John D. Dingell, Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce
The Honorable Carlos J. Moorhead, Ranking Republican Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce

Appendix II
Comparison of Commission,

AICPA,

and International

Independence

Requirements

The Commission staff responds to numerous oral and written
requests for informal advice on the application of the Commission's
independence requirements.

In responding to those requests,

the

Commission staff evaluates the specific facts and circumstances of
each situation and renders

its views based on the

requirements of both the Commission and the AICPA.

independence

Thus, auditors

to U.S. public companies must comply with two sets of independence
requirements--AICPA

requirements

Likewise,

to

auditors

and

transnational

Commission
issuers

requirements.

seeking

to

list

securities on a U.S. exchange or offer securities to U.S. investors
generally would be

required

to

comply with both U.S.

country independence requirements.

and home

The significant independence

requirements are discussed below in detail including a discussion
of

the

significant

requirements

and

the

contained

the

Code

in

differences
AICPA's
of

between

requirements,

Ethics

for

the
the

Professional

Commission's
requirements
Accountants

promulgated by the International Federation of Accountants

("IFAC

Code"), 1/ and requirements prevalent in other parts of the world. 2/

1/

The IFAC Code was developed by IFAC's Ethics Committee and
was proposed for public comment on June 1, 1989.
It provides
guidance for member countries to consider in setting their own
local independence requirements. The IFAC Code was issued in
July 1990 and revised in July 1992.

2/

The examples of other countries' standards have been drawn
from the Commission staff's review of selected portions of
those countries' laws and professional literature.
This
presentation is of necessity incomplete and may not reflect
fully all technical interpretations or their application in
practice.

2
A.

Applicability of Standards to Accounting Firm Personnel

The

principal

difference

between

the

SEC

and

AICPA

requirements is the applicability of the Commission's requirements
to all firm employees that provide any professional services to the
client,

not

limited

solely

to

those

employees

working

on

an

engagement requiring independence.

Australia, France, 3/ Italy, and the Netherlands have adopted
rules that can be read to apply to all employees of the firm.

The

IFAC Code and Germany's requirements extend to all partners and
certified professional personnel,
participating

on

the

as well as all other employees

engagement.

Canada's

requirements

4/

generally are applicable only to partners, while key Japanese 5/
and British requirements generally are applicable only to personnel
participating in the audit.

B.

Financial Interests

1. Direct and Indirect Interests
The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence
will

be

considered

to

be

impaired

if

during

the

period

of

a

3/

Examples of French requirements cited are those applicable to
the Order des Experts Comptables et des Comptables Agrees
which represents qualified practicing accountants. Additional
requirements
apply
to
statutory
auditors
in
certain
circumstances.

4/

Independence requirements in Canada are established by the
provincial
institutes
of
chartered
accountants.
The
requirements of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Ontario are being used here as representative of Canadian
requirements.

5/

Examples of Japanese regulations cited are those applicable
to
the
independence
of
audit
corporations
auditing
consolidated financial statements.

3
professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion,
a member or a member's
direct or material

firm had or was

indirect

financial

committed to acquire a

interest

in the

[client].

(AICPA Ethics Interpretation (Interp.) No. 101-1)

A direct or indirect financial interest held by a spouse or
dependent person is ascribed to the member (Interp. 101-9)

The
except

Commission's

that

a

requirements

direct

financial

are

similar

interest

to

includes

the
one

AICPA's
held

by

persons other than the accountant's spouse who are resident in the
member's

household,

and

any person subject

supervision or control.

to

the accountant's

Materiality is determined primarily b y

reference to the net worth of the accountant, his or her firm, and
the client.

No specific

(Codification

of

level

Financial

is specified as being material.

Reporting

Policies

(FRP)

Section

602.02.b.i)

The IFAC Code,

and requirements in Canada and Germany,

essentially

the

Netherlands,

and Japan have adopted rules that prohibit material

financial

same

interests

immaterial
financial

as

in

financial
interests,

the

AICPA.

clients,

but

interests.
while

Britain

Australia,

are

permit

Italy's

direct
rules

prohibits

France,

or

the

indirect

prohibit

direct

any

financial

interests.

2. Relationships with Trusts H o lding Financial Interests

The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence
will

be

considered

to

be

impaired

if

during

the

period

of

a

professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion,
a member or a member's firm was a trustee of any trust or executor
of

any estate

if such trust

or estate had or was

committed to

acquire any direct or material indirect financial interest in the
[client].

(Interp. 101-1)

4

The Commission's requirements also prohibit such relationships
with minor exceptions for foreign auditors. (FRP 602.02.g, examples
18 and 19)

The IFAC Code prohibits auditors from serving as trustees of
trusts holding interests material to the audit client or to the
holdings of the estate or trust.

The Australian,

British standards are similar to the IFAC Code.

Canadian,

and

Italy prohibits

holding a controlling financial interest in a client,
Netherlands and Germany prohibit any such relationship.

while the
Rules in

France and Japan do not address the subject.

3. Joint, Closely Held Investments
The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence
will

be

considered

to

be

impaired

if

during

the

period

of

a

professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion,
a member or a member's firm had a joint,

closely held investment

with

director,

the

[client]

or

with

any

officer,

or principal

stockholder thereof that was material in relation to the net worth
of the member or the member's firm.

The

Commission

would

(Interp. 101-1)

consider

such

a

relationship

to

constitute a direct business relationship with a client or persons
associated

with

independence,

the

client.

issue.

a

irrespective of materiality.

The rules in Canada,
this

Such

France,

relationship

impairs

(FRP 602.02.g)

Italy, and Japan are silent on

The Netherlands has rules

that are similar to the

AICPA's, while Australia prohibits "mutual business interests" with
clients and their officers and employees.

The IFAC Code, Germany,

and Britain urge caution, noting that such relationships may impair
independence.

5
4.L o a n s

The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence
will

be

considered

to

be

impaired

if

during

the

period

of

a

professional engagement or at the time of expressing an opinion,
a member or a member's firm had any loan6 / to or from the [client]
or any officer, director, or principal stockholder of the [client].
The following loans from a financial institution7/ when made under
normal

lending

procedures,

terms,

and

requirements8 /

are

not

6/

A loan includes a guarantee of a loan, a letter of credit, and
a line of credit.
A loan to a limited partnership in which
members have a combined investment exceeding 50% of the total
limited partnership interests is considered a loan to these
members.

7/

A financial institution is considered to be an entity that,
as part of its normal business operations, makes loans to the
general public.

8/

Normal lending procedures, terms, and requirements relating
to a member's loan from a financial institution are defined
as those that are reasonably comparable with those relating
to loans of a similar character committed to other borrowers
during the period in which the loan to the member is
committed.
In making such comparison and in evaluating
whether a loan was made under "normal lending procedures,
terms, and requirements," the member should consider all the
circumstances under which the loan was granted, including:
a.

The amount of the loan in relation to the
value of the collateral pledged as security
and the credit standing of the m ember or the
member's firm.

b.

Repayment terms.

c.

Interest rate,

d.

Closing costs.

e.

General
public.

including points.

availability of
(Interp. 101-5)

such

loans

to

the

(continued__ )

6
considered to impair independence.

Such loans,

however, must be

kept current at all times as to all terms.

a.

Automobile

loans

and

leases

collateralized

by

automobiles.

b.

Loans of the cash surrender value under terms of a life
insurance policy.

c.

Borrowings fully collateralized by cash deposits at the
same financial institution.

d.

Credit cards and cash advances on checking accounts with
an aggregate balance

not paid

currently of

$5,000

or

less.

The

following

institution under
terms,
1992,

types
that

loans

obtained

institution's normal

and requirements,
(ii)

of

and

(i)

from

a

financial

lending procedures,

that existed as of January 1,

that were obtained from a financial institution prior

to its becoming a client requiring independence,

(iii)

that were

obtained from a financial institution for which independence was
not

required

and

that

were

later

sold

to

a

client

for

which

independence is required, or (iv) that were obtained from a firm's
financial institution client requiring independence, by a borrower
prior to his or her becoming a member with respect to such client
also would not be considered to inpair independence.

Such loans

must, at all times, be current as to all terms and such terms shall

8 /(... continued)
This definition applies in the cases of both loans that
currently
may
be
made
and
to
the
loans
that
were
"grandfathered" as of January 1, 1992, which are discussed
below.

7
not be renegotiated after the latest of the dates in

(i) through

(iv) above.

e.

Home mortgages.

f.

Other secured loans.
equal

or exceed the

The collateral on such loans must
remaining balance

of the

loan at

January 1, 1992 and at all times thereafter.

g.

Loans not material to the member's net worth.

Furthermore,

an auditor may borrow from the non-client parent of

an audit client, provided that the audit client is not material to
the lender.

(AICPA Ethics Ruling No. 98)

The Commission has not adopted requirements

in addition to

those of the AICPA in this area.
The

IFAC

Code

is

similar

to

the

AICPA's

requirements.

Australia,

Canada,

and Britain have adopted rules similar to the

IFAC Code.

France and Italy prohibit any loans while Japan and the

Netherlands prohibit material loans.

5. Interests in Non-Clients

The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence
may be affected if he or she has a financial interest in a n o n 
client that has an investor9 / or investee10/ relationship with the

9/

The term "investor" means a parent, a general partner, or a
natural person or corporation that has the ability to exercise
significant influence, as defined in Accounting Principles
Board Opinion No. 1 8 . "The Equity Method of Accounting for
Investments in Common Stock," through the financial interest.

8
client.1 1 /

Where a brother-sister common control situation exists

between a client and a non-client, an immaterial investment in the
non-client generally would not impair independence.
venture situation,
client

investor

an immaterial

generally

would

financial
not

interest

impair

In a joint
in the n o n 

independence

with

respect to the client investee, provided that the member could not
significantly influence the non-client investor.

(Interp. 101-8)

The Commission requires an accountant to be independent of an
audit

client

affiliates.12/

and

all

of

its

parents,

subsidiaries,

and

(S-X, 2 - 0 1 (b))

Interpretations by the Commission's staff prohibit investments
by a member

(as defined in Rule 2-01(b)

of Regulation S-X

(S-X))

in a non-audit client if the member has knowledge of an investment
or intention to invest by an audit client, or a person identified
with an audit client, in the same or an affiliated entity.
an

investment

If such

is made without knowledge of similar action by a

client or person identified with the client (and the investment is
not

a

jointly,

closely

held

investment), upon

learning

of

the

client's involvement, the investment may be retained by the member

10/(...continued)
10/ An investee is defined as a subsidiary or an entity subject
to the significant influence of the investor.

11/

For example: where a non-client investee is material to a
client investor, any direct or material indirect financial
interest
in
the
non-client by
a member would
im pair
independence; and where a client investee is material to a
non-client investor, any direct or material indirect interest
in the non-client by a member would impair independence.

12/

An
affiliate
is
defined as
a person
(an individual,
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust,
or unincorporated organization
(S-X,
102 (p))) that directly, or indirectly through one or more
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under
common control with, the person specified.
(S-X, 1 - 0 2 (b))

9
provided that the investment is immaterial to the member.

If the

investment represents 5% or more of the member's net worth, it must
be sold to an unrelated party to avoid an independence problem.

The IFAC Code and British requirements do not address this
issue.

Australia,

holdings.

France,

Canada,
Japan,

and

Italy

generally

proscribe

such

and the Netherlands prohibit material

financial interests in investors or investees of an audit client.
Germany proscribes the ownership of shares in any company owning
more than 20% of an audit client.

C.

Appointments in Clients

1. Persons Currently Associated with the Accountant

The AICPA's requirements state that a member's independence
will be considered to be impaired if during the period covered by
the

financial

statements,

during

the

period

of

a

engagement,

or at the time of expressing an opinion,

a member's

firm was

connected with the

[client]

professional
a member or

as a promoter,

underwriter, or voting trustee, as a director or officer, or in any
capacity equivalent

to that of a member of management

or of an

employee or was a trustee for any pension or profit-sharing trust
of the

[client].

(Interp. 101-1)

A member's firm will not include an employee

(as opposed to

a proprietor, partner, or shareholder) solely because he or she was
formerly associated with the client in any of those capacities, if
that employee has disassociated himself or herself from the client
and does not participate in the engagement for the client covering
any period of his or her association with the client.

Similarly,

the term "member's firm" shall include all individuals who provide
services to clients and are located in an office participating in
a significant portion of the engagement,
this rule.

(Interp. 101-9)

for purposes of applying

10

A member may serve as the honorary director or trustee of a
not-for-profit client of a charitable, religious, civic, or similar
nature so long as he or she holds a purely honorary position and
is identified as holding such in all letterheads and externally
circulated materials in which he or she is named as a director or
trustee, restricts participation to the use of his or her name, and
cannot vote

or

otherwise

participate

in management

functions.

(Interp. 101-4)

The
however,

Commission's

requirements

are

substantially

the

same;

the exception regarding persons formerly associated with

a client differs somewhat.

The Commission applies that exception

to a person formerly associated as an officer or employee who is
employed by or becomes a partner, shareholder, or other principal
in

the

firm when

such

individual

has

completely

disassociated

himself or herself from the client and its affiliates and does not
participate in the audit of the financial statements covering any
period of his or her employment b y the client.

The

IFAC

Code

and

all

of

national

(S-X, 2-01 (b))

rules

studied

by

the

Commission staff contain restrictions similar to those included in
the AICPA requirements.

2. former partners
The

AICPA

rules

connected with the
trustee,

state

that

a

former

practitioner

who

is

[client] as a promoter, underwriter, or voting

as a director or officer,

or in any capacity equivalent

to that of a member of management or of an employee or as a trustee
for any pension or profit-sharing trust of the client, also would
impair the

firm's

independence with respect

to the

client with

which the former partner is associated unless certain provisions
are met.

Those provisions are

(i) the payment of the amounts due

to the former practitioner for his or her interest in the firm and

11
for unfunded, vested retirement benefits according to the payment
schedule in effect should be such that the payments do not cause
a substantial doubt about the firm's ability to continue as a going
concern for a reasonable period of time,

(ii) such payments must

be fixed as to amount and payment dates and may be adjusted only
for inflation,

(iii) the former practitioner does not participate

in the firm's business or professional activities, whether or not
compensated

for

such

participation,

and

(iv)

the

former

practitioner does not appear to participate in the activities of,
or be associated with, his or her former firm; however, a former
partner may be provided an office and related amenities without
violating this requirement unless he or she is in a position of
significant influence with the audit client.

(Interp. 101-2)

The Commission's rules also require that the former partner's
capital

balances

be

paid

in

full

prior

to

commencement

of

an

engagement by the auditor or acceptance of the position of director
by the

former partner,

problem

also

may

whichever

exist

when

is relevant.

the

former

associated with the provision of services
short period of
with,

or

time

substantial

(two years)
ownership

An

independence

partner

was

closely

to a client within a

prior to accepting a position

interest

in,

the

client.

(FRP

602.02.f)

If a former partner proposes to accept a responsible position
(officer)

with

partner must

a

client

terminate

of his
all

or her

former firm,

relationships

with

the

the

former

former
firm,

including the full payment of any retirement benefits payable to
him or her.

The IFAC Code does not address the issue of former partners.
Canada's rules are similar to those of the AICPA.

The rules in

France, Japan, Britain, and Germany do not place any restrictions
on such appointments.
firm

and

the

retired

The rules in the Netherlands state that the
partner

must

determine

whether

such

an

12
appointment

would

impair

the

independence

of

the

firm.

In

Australia, all independence requirements apply to retired partners,
referred to as principals in Australia, who are required to render
services to their former firm when asked to do so.

In Italy,

a

three-year period must expire before a former partner may take a
position with an audit client.

D.

Other Professional Services

1. Bookkeeping

Under the AICPA's requirements, a member performing accounting
services for an audit client must meet the following requirements
to

retain

the

appearance

of

independence

in

the

eyes

of

a

reasonable observer.

a.

The

client

must

accept

the

responsibility

financial statements as his or her own.

for

the

The client must

be sufficiently informed of the enterprise's activities
and

financial

condition and the applicable accounting

principles so that he or she can reasonably accept such
responsibility,

including

specifically,

fairness

of

valuation and presentation and adequacy of disclosure.
When necessary,
matters

with

the accountant must discuss accounting
the

client

to

assist

the

client

in

understanding such matters.

b.

The accountant must not assume the role of an employee
or

of

management

conducting

the

operations

of

the

client's business.13/

13/

For example, the accountant shall not consummate transactions,
h a v e custody of assets, or exercise authority on behalf of the
client.
The client must prepare the source documents on all
transactions in sufficient detail to identify clearly the
(continued...)

13

c.

The

accountant

must

comply

with

generally

accepted

auditing standards including an examination of financial
statements prepared from books and records that he or she
has maintained completely or in part.

(Interp. 101-3)

The Commission's position is that the accountant cannot be
deemed independent with regard to auditing financial statements of
a

client

if

the

accountant

has

participated

manually or through its computer services,

closely,

either

in maintenance of the

basic accounting records and preparation of financial statements,
or if the accountant performs other accounting services through
which

he

or

decisions.

she

participates

management

in

operational

Where source data are prepared by the client and the

accountant's

work

is

listings and reports,
the

with

listings

and

limited

to

processing

and

production

of

independence will be affected adversely if

reports

become

part

of

the

basic

accounting

records on which, at least in part, the accountant would base his
or her opinion.

(FRP 602.02.c)

The IFAC Code is generally consistent with the AICPA rules,
with the further proviso that personnel who provide bookkeeping
services normally should not participate in the audit.
the Netherlands are similar to the IFAC Code.

Rules in

Japan and Germany

appear to prohibit bookkeeping services for audit clients.
and

France permit

bookkeeping

services

personnel perform such services,

without

regard

Canada

to which

although France proscribes such

13/(...continued)
nature and amount of such transactions and maintain an
accounting control over data processed by the accountant such
as control totals and document counts. The accountant should
not make changes in such basic data without the concurrence
of the client.

14
services by statutory auditors. 14/ Australia and Britain prohibit
bookkeeping

for

public

companies,

but

permit

it

for

private

companies with provisions similar to those of the AICPA.

Italy's

rules

allowed

do

not

include

bookkeeping

services

among

the

services that may be performed by auditors.
2.

Other Serv ic e s

The
services

AICPA

states

relating

to

that
the

an

accountant

implementation

of

performing
an

advisory

information

and

control system must take reasonable precautions to restrict his or
her supervisory activities to initial instruction and training of
personnel.

The

client

must

make

all

significant

management

decisions relating to the implementation of the project.

(Ethics

Ruling No. 55.)
Performance by a member of appraisal, valuation, or actuarial
services, the results of which may be incorporated to the client's
financial statements, would not impair a member's independence if
all of the significant matters of judgment involved are determined
or approved by the client and the client is in a position to have
an informed judgment on the results of those services.

(Ethics

Ruling No. 54.)
The SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms
prohibits member firms
certain

actuarial

from providing executive recruitment and

services

to

the

member

firms'

public

audit

clients.
The Commission,

in Accounting Series Release 264, identified

several criteria that should be considered in determining whether

14/

Statutory auditors are required for certain entities under
the laws of a number of countries.
The duties of statutory
auditors are prescribed by law and frequently extend beyond
an examination of the financial statements.

15
the performance

of

specific non-audit

services

would

impair an

auditor's independence, either in appearance or in fact.

Included

among those factors are:

a.

The

dependence

service

("MAS”)

of

the

fees

auditor
(for

on management

example,

the

advisory

relationship

between total MAS revenues and total firm revenues and
between MAS

revenues

from an individual

client to the

client's audit fee),

b.

Avoidance of supplanting the role of management as the
result of an MAS engagement, and

c.

Avoidance of self-review by the auditor,

including the

effect on objectivity of auditing the product of systems
designed by the auditor.
The

Commission's

independence
management

staff

of accountants

advisory

has

raised questions

who have provided

services

to audit

regarding

certain

clients.

Those

types

the
of

services

include:

d.

Preparation

of

prospective

financial

information

and

feasibility studies,

e.

f.

Issuance of fairness opinions and valuation reports, and

Mergers

and

accountant

acquisitions
participated

related
in

services

negotiations

or

where

the

decision

making on behalf of, or with, the client.

The IFAC Code does not cover these services specifically, nor
do

the

rules

of

any

country

studied

by

the

Commission

However,

the IFAC Code and the rules in Australia,

Germany

state

that

the

auditor

should

not

staff.

Britain,

perform

and

executive

16
functions while rendering non-audit services to audit clients, and
in

the

Netherlands

auditors

are

cautioned

to

assure

independence is not impaired by non-audit services.

that

The staff is

aware that services involving the issuance of fairness opinions and
valuation

reports,

including

to

audit

clients,

routinely

are

performed by auditors in some countries.
e.

Litigation

The AICPA states

that

actual

or

threatened

litigation may

affect independence, since the relationship between an auditor and
client

should

be

one

of

complete

candor

and

full

disclosure

regarding all aspects of the client's business operations.
Litigation
independence.

between

a

member

and

a

client

may

impair

When the present management of the client commences,

or expresses an intention to commence,

legal action against the

auditor,

be

positions

the
in

auditor
which

and

client

management's

may

placed

willingness

to

in
make

adversary
complete

disclosures and the auditor's objectivity may be affected by selfinterest.15/

15/

For example:
a.

the
commencement
of
alleging deficiencies
independence;

litigation by management
in audit work would impair

b.

the commencement
of litigation by the member
alleging management fraud or deceit would impair
independence;

c.

an expressed intention by management to commence
litigation alleging deficiencies in audit work would
impair independence if the member concludes that
there is a strong possibility that such a suit
actually will be filed;

d.

litigation not related to audit work for the client
for an amount not material to the member's firm
(continued...)
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Litigation against a member and the client, or its management,
would

not

have

necessarily

an

adverse

im pact

These situations must be examined carefully,

on

independence.

however,

since the

potential for adverse interests may exist if cross-claims are filed
against the member,

or if the member alleges fraud or deceit by

present management as a defense.
Litigation by other third parties against a member generally
does not inpair independence unless the member alleges fraud or
deceit by management as a defense.

(Interp. 101-6)

The Commission's requirements are generally consistent with
the AICPA's, except

(i) even the likelihood of litigation between

the client and accountant may have an inpact on independence if the
accountant concludes that there is a strong probability that a suit
will be brought, since in those circumstances both parties may be
taking actions that are primarily designed to protect their legal
positions,

which would prejudice effective communication between

them,

(ii)

and

independence also may be

impaired in situations

where management and the accountant are bound so closely together
in their defenses of a suit brought by a third party that they have
a commonality of legal interest.

(FRP 602.02.i.ii)

1 5 /(...continued)
generally would not inpair independence; and
e.

litigation by security holders against a member and
the client or its management may impair independence
although the litigation itself may not alter the
fundamental relationship between the member and the
client's management
(e.g., independence may be
impaired if cross claims are filed against the
member alleging that he or she is responsible for
any deficiencies in the financial statements, and
independence may be impaired if the auditor alleges
fraud or deceit by management as a defense).
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The IFAC Code contains advisory language similar to that in
the AICPA's requirements.

None of the countries studied by the

staff addressed this issue.

F.

Family Relationships

The AICPA states that a member's independence may be impaired
by a family relationship with a person connected with the audit
client.

Relationships

proscribed

for

the

member

also

are

proscribed for his or her spouse and any dependent persons, except
that independence normally will not be impaired solely because of
the employment of a spouse or dependent person in a position that
does not allow significant influence.

However,

if the member's

spouse or dependent relative is in an audit sensitive position1 6 /,
the individual member should not participate in the engagement.

The independence of a member and his or her firm also would
be impaired as the result of a family relationship when the member
participates

in

the

engagement

relative17/ of the member
over the client,

and

a

non-dependent,

close

(i) can exercise significant influence

(ii) is employed in an audit sensitive position,

or (iii) has a material financial interest, which is known by the
member,

in the client.

16/

A person's activities would be considered audit sensitive if
such activities are normally an element of, or subject to,
significant internal accounting controls such as cashier,
internal auditor, accounting supervisor, purchasing agent, or
inventory warehouse supervisor.

17/

A close relative is defined as including non-dependent
children, grandchildren,
stepchildren, brothers, sisters,
grandparents, parents, parents-in-law, and their respective
spouses.
Close relatives do not include the brothers and
sisters of the member's spouse.
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The independence of a member and his or her firm also would
be impaired as the result of a family relationship when the member
is located in an office participating in a significant portion of
the engagement and a non-dependent,

close relative can exercise

significant influence over the client.

The

Commission's

requirements

(Interp. 101-9)

state

that

a presumption

of

impairment is related directly to the closeness of the family bond.
Attention also is directed to other factors such as the positions
occupied by

the parties

in their respective employment.

Minor

differences between the SEC's and the AICPA's requirements exist
in

the

definition

of

"close

relative.”

The

impairment

of

independence may be mitigated where there is adequate geographic
separation of the individual accountant from the family member and
from the engagement to preclude the possibility of contacts and
influence

that

accountant's
impaired.

could

and his

give

or her

rise

to

firm's

a

conclusion

that

the

independence appeared to be

(FRP 602.02.h)

The IFAC Code states that each member body should decide,

in

light of social conditions existing in its own country, what degree
of relationship with a client should be regarded as too close, and,
therefore,

should

be

proscribed

approach to professional work
Family relationships

to

ensure

for that

that

an

objective

client will not

suffer.

that always pose an unacceptable threat to

independence are those in which a sole practitioner or a partner
in a practice, or an employee assigned to the engagement relating
to the client, is the spouse, dependent child, or relative living
in a common household with the client's principal owners, executive
directors, or financial officers.

Italy's
partner,
audit

director,

firm

Canada's

rules
and

proscribe

family

statutory auditor,

their

independence

counterparts
requirements

relationships

between

or general manager
in

a

client

proscribe

a

of an

organization.

only members

of

a

20
partner's household from serving as officers or directors of audit
clients.

Japan's

partner's

immediate

requirements
relatives

proscribe
from

the

working

audit

for

engagement

the

client

as

officers,

officer-equivalents,

or other positions related to the

client's

financial

Rules

affairs.

Netherlands,

Germany,

impaired

family

by

in

Australia,

and Britain note that

relationships,

but

do

France,

the

independence may be

not

address

specific

family relationships.
g.

Fees

1. Magnitude or Concentration

The AICPA does not address this issue.
The Commission's published requirements do not specifically
address

this

issue;

however,

the

Commission's

staff

raises

questions regarding the independence of accountants who derive more
than

15%

of

their

total

revenues

from

one

client

or

group

of

related clients, based on the belief that a concentration of fees
in

excess

of

that

on

the

dependent

Determinations

limit

causes

client

are based

the

or

on the

accountant

group

of

facts and

to

be

related

overly

clients.

circumstances

of

the

particular case.

British rules cite a 15% threshold as raising questions about
independence.

The Netherlands states that an auditor should not

report on the financial statements of a client on which the auditor
is consistently and to a material extent dependent for income.

The

IFAC Code, Australia, France, and Germany caution against deriving
a substantial portion of a firm's fees from one client or a related
group.
although

Canada,
in

Italy,

Italy

fees

and

Japan

are

set

do
in

not

address

accordance

the

with

subject,

guidelines

established by securities regulators and there is a maximum term
for which an auditor may serve a particular client.
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2. Unpaid Prior Professional Fees

The AICPA states that the independence of a member's firm may
be

impaired

statements

if,

when

the

report

on

the

for the current year is issued,

client's

financial

fees remain unpaid,

whether billed or unbilled, for professional services provided more
than one year prior to the date of the report.
assume the characteristics of a loan.

Such unpaid amounts

(Ethics Ruling No. 52)

The Commission's requirements have not been updated to reflect
the AICPA's requirements, which were revised in November 1990.

The

Commission's requirements state that unpaid fees that are material
with respect to the current year audit fee must be paid prior to
the commencement of the current audit.

When an unpaid fee problem

exists in connection with the audit of financial statements to be
included

in

statement,

an

annual

report

as

opposed

to

a

registration

these guidelines sometimes are modified.

The client

either may arrange to pay the past due fees prior to the issuance
of the audit report or agree to an arrangement to make periodic
payments to settle the delinquent fees.

In the latter case,

the

auditor must conclude that there is reasonable assurance that all
fees will be paid prior to the commencement of the audit for the
ensuing year.

(FRP 602.02.b.v)

The Commission's staff generally

would apply the more restrictive AICPA requirements.

The IFAC Code states that fees unpaid for an extended period
may

impair

independence.

France

states

that

fees

should

be

collected in accordance with the auditor's normal billing terms.
Other countries do not address this issue.

3. Commissions and Contingent Fees
Under the AICPA's Rules of the Code of Professional Conduct,
commissions received for the referral of products or services of
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others to a client, payments to obtain a client

(referral fees),

and contingent fees received under an arrangement whereby no fee
will be charged unless a specified finding or result is obtained
or where the amount of the fee is otherwise contingent upon the
finding or results of such services, are prohibited by the AICPA
if a member or his or her firm provides attest services to the
client.

The receipt of such fees is prohibited during the period

of the attest services engagement and during the period covered by
any

historical

services.

financial

statements

involved

in

such

attest

(Ethics Rules 302 and 503)

Fees are not considered to be contingent if fixed by courts
or, in tax matters, if determined based on the results of judicial
proceedings or the findings of governmental agencies.

The Commission has not adopted requirements

in addition to

those of the AICPA in this area.
The

IFAC

Code

is

similar

to

the

AICPA's

requirements.

Contingent fee arrangements are permitted in certain circumstances
in Britain with disclosure.

H.

The

Goods and Services from Client

AICPA's

requirements

state

that

the

acceptance

by

an

employee or partner of more than a token gift from a client, even
with the knowledge of the member's firm, may cause the appearance
of independence to be lacking.

(Ethics Ruling No. 1)

The Commission has not adopted requirements

in addition to

those of the AICPA in this area.
The

IFAC Code notes

that hospitality and gifts

on a scale

beyond that which is commensurate with the normal courtesies of
social life should not be accepted.

Rules of Australia,

France,
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Japan,

and

AICPA's

the

rule.

Netherlands
Britain

generally

permits

are

auditors

consistent
to

acquire

with

the

goods

and

services on terms no more favorable than those available to all of
a client's employees.
by Canada,
I.

The subject is not addressed specifically

Italy, and Germany.
B u s i n e s s Relationships with Clients

In addition to the AICPA's requirements regarding financial
interests discussed in section B., the AICPA's requirements state
that independence will be considered impaired if, during the period
of

a

professional

opinion,

a

member

engagement
had

any

or

at

the

cooperative

time

of

expressing

arrangement18/

with

an
the

client that was material to the member's firm or to the client.
(Interp.

101-12)

A member leasing property to an audit

client

creates an indirect financial interest in the client that impairs
independence if that indirect financial
that member.

(Ethics Ruling No.

58)

interest

However,

is material

to

a member leasing

property from an audit client does not impair independence if, at
the time the lease is entered into,

it meets the criteria of an

operating lease and is made under normal leasing procedures, terms,
and requirements.

(Ethics Ruling No. 91)

In addition, a member's

limited partnership interest in a limited partnership in which a
client

is

independence

18/

the

general

with

partner

respect

to

would

that

impair

client

if

that
the

member's
respective

A cooperative arrangement exists when a member's firm and a
client jointly participate in a business activity.
Examples
cited are prime/subcontractor arrangements to provide services
or products to a third party; joint ventures to develop or
market products or services, arrangements to combine one or
more services or products of the firm with one or more
services or products of the client and market the package with
references to both parties, and distribution or marketing
arrangements under which the firm acts as the distributor or
marketer of the client's products or services or the client
acts as the distributor or marketer of the products or
services of the firm.
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investments in the limited partnership are material to either the
client or the member.
interest

(Ethics Ruling No.

81)

A member's joint

in a vacation home along with an officer,

director,

or

principal stockholder of an audit client would impair the member's
independence

with

respect

to

that

client

if

the

investment

is

material to either the officer, director, or principal stockholder
or the member.

(Ethics Ruling No. 92)

The Commission's requirements state that direct and material
indirect business relationships,

other than as a consumer in the

normal course of business, with a client or with persons associated
with the client in a decision-making capacity,

such as officers,

directors, or substantial stockholders, will adversely affect the
accountant's independence with respect to that client.
to the

relationships

joint

business

discussed previously

ventures,

limited

In addition

in sections

partnership

investments in supplier or customer companies,

C and D,

agreements,

leasing interests

(other than immaterial landlord-tenant relationships), and sales
by the accountant of items other than professional services are
examples of other prohibited relationships.

The Commission's rules also state that an accountant cannot
maintain

margin

or

discretionary

accounts

with

a broker-dealer

audit client, and must take delivery on a timely basis of any cash
or

securities

resulting

from

transactions

regular cash account with such a client.

executed

through

(FRP 802.02.g)

The IFAC Code does not specifically address this issue.
rules of Australia,
Germany
business

variously

proscribe,

France,
limit,

Italy,
or

mentioned

m u tu a l

among

the

express

countries

The

the Netherlands,
concern

relationships with clients and the clients'

Specifically
v e n tu r e s ,

Britain,

a

are

and

about

personnel.

joint

business

business interests, and contractual relationships.

Canada and Japan make no specific references to the subject.
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J.

Incompatible Occupations

The AICPA considers independence impaired if legal services
rendered to an audit client result in undue identification with
management.

(Ethics Ruling No. 51)

The Commission's requirements state that certain concurrent
occupations

of

accountants

engaged

in

the

practice

of

public

accounting involve relationships with clients that may jeopardize
the

accountant's

objectivity

independence.

In

relationships

and

occupation
complete

are

not

general,

and,

this

activities

with

arises

the

with

the

appearance

For

concurrent

objectives

of

fundamentally different from those of a public accountant.
following

primary

her

because

associated

auditor's

or

are

the

have

an

his

that

example,

or

situation

customarily

compatible

objectivity

therefore,

occupations

are

generally

prohibited:

a.

Acting as counsel,
personal

since a legal counsel enters into a

relationship

with

a

client

and

is primarily

concerned with the personal rights and interests of the
client,

b.

Acting as a broker/dealer,

since customary activities

could involve securities transactions of clients either
as issuer or investor,

and provide third parties with

sufficient reason to question the accountant's ability
to be impartial and objective, or

c.

Actively engaging in direct competition in a commercial
enterprise, since that would appear to third parties to
be

a

conflict

a c c o u n t a n t 's

access

to

of

interests

that

might

influence

the

objectivity because he or she would have

the

records,

business competitor.

policies

and

(FRP 602.02.e)

practices

of

a
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The IFAC Code and almost all of the country standards studied
by

the

Commission

occupations.
and

the

staff

For

some

notion

of

incompatible

However, some did not mention specific occupations,

occupations

widely.

contained

specifically

example,

identified

by

Japan prohibits virtually

others
all

varied

concurrent

occupations other than those directly related to the practice of
public accounting.

Germany, which also excludes most occupations,

specifically permits
audit

client),

the practice of law

engineering,

science,

(although not

teaching,

and

for any

rendering

financial advice.

K.

Indemnification by a Client

The

AICPA

rules

state

that

the

inclusion

in

engagements

letters of a clause that provides that the client would release,
indemnify,
heirs,

executors,

assigns)
knowing

defend,

harmless

and hold the member
personal
from

any

misrepresentations

auditor's independence.

(and his or her partners,

representatives,
liability

by

and

management

successors,

costs
would

resulting
not

imp a i r

and
from
the

(Ethics Ruling No. 94)

The Commission's requirements state that an accountant cannot
be indemnified against liability for his or her own negligent acts,
whether of omission or commission, since one of the major stimuli
to objective or unbiased consideration of the problems encountered
in a particular engagement is removed or greatly weakened.

(FRP

602.02.i)

Neither the IFAC nor the requirements of any country studied
by the staff address this issue.

End

